The Modern American
Volume 7 | Issue 1

Article 1

2011

Volume 7 Issue 1 (Spring 2011)

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/tma
Recommended Citation
(2011) "Volume 7 Issue 1 (Spring 2011)," The Modern American: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/tma/vol7/iss1/1

This Entire Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Modern American by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Volume 7 Issue 1 (Spring 2011)

This entire issue is available in The Modern American: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/tma/vol7/iss1/1

Volume 7 - Issue 1

Spring 2011

THE MODERN AMERICAN
A Publication Dedicated to Diversity and the Law

Is a Second Mommy a Good
Enough Second Parent?: Why
Voluntary Acknowledgments of
Paternity Should be Available to
Lesbian Co-Parents
Julia Saladino
Legal Impediments Facing
Nonimmigrants Entering
Licensed Professions
Justin Storch
The Emerging Trend of
Extending ADA Reasonable
Accommodation beyond
the Workplace to Include
Commuting Issues: A comment
on Colwell v. Rite Aid
Frederick J. Melkey
Race and Immigration Law:
A Troubling Marriage
Lisa Sandoval
Book Review: Brock Thompson’s
The Un–Natural State: Arkansas
and the Queer South
Katy Bosse
Conference Highlights:
Reﬂections of a Law Student
from the Hip Hop Generation
Shailee Diwanji
Symposium Highlights:
What, Exactly, Is a
“Post-White” America?
M. Coleen Wilson

TM

THE MODERN AMERICAN
Letter from the Executive Board

I

Staff
Executive Board

n this issue The Modern American features a broad spectrum
of stimulating articles that continue The Modern American’s goal
of fostering the discourse on diversity.
As The Modern American’s readership base continues to expand, the Volume 7 Executive Board would like to thank the
Volume 6 leaders who, through the Strategic Plan Initiative, increased The Modern American’s digital presence. As always, subscribers may access The Modern American via LexisNexis, HeinOnline, and Westlaw databases. Now subscribers may interact
with The Modern American on our blog, Modern America, and
access various resources on our Digital Commons website. The
Digital Commons platform allows readers to access the current
issue, archived issues, and also acts as a submission repository
for authors. This digital expansion ushered in a new era for The
Modern American, and the Volume 7 board hopes subscribers will
continue to patronize these new digital platforms and enrich the
community experience.
Modern America: The Modern American’s Law & Politics Blog,
www.wclmodernamerican.blogspot.com.
The Modern American @ the Digital Commons,
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/tma/.

Sincerely Yours,
The Executive Board

The Modern American

Editor-in-Chief
Michele-Ann Wilson
Executive Editor
Keyla Bade
Senior Managing Editor
Alex Diaz-Ferguson
Senior Articles Editor
Rachel Zoghlin
Senior Marketing Editor
Alexandra Manrique
Senior Staff Editor
Leslie Morris
__________________
Symposium Editor
John Rogos
Articles Editors
Brian Aragon, Elliot Kennedy, Amer Raja, Paul Schuh
Staff Writers
Kathryn Bosse, Ashly Hinmon, Beiah Mejia, Justin Storch
Junior Staff
Shailee Diwanji, April Fuller, Danielle Hart, Bret Mooney,
David Wexelblat, Leah Wissow
Assistant Managing Editors
Ruth Obaseki, Rachel Fisher
Blog Contributors
Zannie Carlson, Shailee Diwanji
Faculty Advisors
Lia Epperson
Sherry Weaver
Cover Art
Neil Ransom

TABLE OF CONTENTS
2

|

Is a Second Mommy a
Good Enough Second
Parent?: Why Voluntary
Acknowledgments of
Paternity Should be
Available to Lesbian
Co-Parents

42

|

Lisa Sandoval
59

|

|

Legal Impediments Facing
Nonimmigrants Entering
Licensed Professions

Justin Storch
22

|

The Emerging Trend of
Extending ADA Reasonable
Accommodation beyond
the Workplace to Include
Commuting Issues: A
comment on Colwell v.

Rite Aid
Frederick J. Melkey

SPRING 2011

Book Review:
Brock Thompson’s

The Un–Natural State:
Arkansas and the
Queer South
Katy Bosse

Julia Saladino
12

Race and Immigration Law:
A Troubling Marriage

64

|

Conference Highlights:
Reﬂections of a Law
Student from the Hip
Hop Generation
Shailee Diwanji

65

|

Symposium Highlights:
What, Exactly, Is a
“Post-White” America?
M. Coleen Wilson

1

IS A SECOND MOMMY A GOOD ENOUGH SECOND
PARENT?: WHY VOLUNTARY ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
OF PATERNITY SHOULD BE AVAILABLE
TO LESBIAN CO-PARENTS
By Julia Saladino1

I. Introduction
Janet Jenkins simply wants to see her
daughter. Jenkins and her former partner, Lisa
Miller, jointly agreed to parent a child together after
obtaining a civil union in Vermont.2 Miller completed
artificial insemination with the consent and support
of Jenkins. After Miller gave birth in Virginia to
the couple’s daughter, Isabella, the two women
cohabitated and co-parented in Virginia before
separating.3 Because Miller is the biological mother
of Isabella, she fervently tried to deny parental rights
to Jenkins after their separation. The case gained
considerable attention, and Miller filed custody
disputes in both Virginia and Vermont. Ultimately,
Virginia’s Supreme Court held that the Vermont
courts have jurisdiction, and Vermont’s Supreme
Court determined that Jenkins did in fact have
parental rights.4 Virginia, therefore, could not modify
the custody order. Even today, Miller continues to
appeal the case and objects to sharing physical custody
with Jenkins.5 Jenkins’ case is not particularly unique.
Same-sex parents all over the country face custody
disputes after separating.6 Often the biological parent
claims full parental authority, and if the parents live in
a state where same-sex marriages or civil unions are
not recognized, the non-biological parent may be left
with limited resources.7
These custody cases raise the family law issue
of what constitutes a parent. If both parties agree
to co-parent, what makes one parent more entitled
to parenting rights than the other? Does biology
dictate parenting rights when the couple has a preestablished agreement to co-parent? In states where
second parent adoption is incredibly difficult or not
available, non-biological parents have limited options
to gain legal parentage over their children.8 This
2

paper argues that alternative avenues for parental
rights, specifically Voluntary Acknowledgements of
Paternity (VAP) which allow the parties to establish
parentage by signing an affidavit shortly after the
child’s birth, should be available to lesbian co-parents.
I further argue that VAPs are appropriate devices to
establish consensual parentage rights at a child’s birth
and that making these forms available to lesbian coparents satisfies the equal protection clause of the
Constitution and meets Congress’ original policy
considerations in developing the federal VAP statute.
II. Background
The VAP process is a simplified
administrative procedure that allows the government
to easily identify parents in the absence of a marital
presumption of parentage.9 One of Congress’
original policy concerns for adopting VAP statutes
in the 1990s was to facilitate the collection of child
support funds.10 In order to put a simplified procedure
in place, Congress created a federal child support
enforcement statute, Title IV-D.11 To receive federal
funding, Congress requires each state to establish
informal procedures for establishing paternity.12
Consequently, each state has a VAP statute in place
to easily facilitate this process without requiring the
involvement of the judicial system every time an
unwed mother gives birth.13
An additional Congressional consideration
when promoting the VAP process is to encourage
the establishment of legal parentage as early in a
child’s life as possible. Because our legal system
recognizes two parents for children, the VAP process
is attractive and allows this determination to be
made with judicial ease.14 The legal determination
of parentage additionally follows the child and her
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parents throughout the country. Because a VAP is
treated as a court order, states view a VAP granted
in another state with full faith and credit, eliminating
the need to litigate parentage when a parent moves
across state lines.15 Not all findings of parentage are
afforded full faith and credit however.16 States are
allowed to refuse to grant full faith and credit to other
state’s statutes, so accordingly, a finding of parentage
based on a statute will not clearly always be afforded
full faith and credit outside that state.17
Court orders, unlike findings of parentage
based on a statute, have portability and are generally
granted full faith and credit.18 Since VAPs are treated
as judicial determinations, states should grant these
parentage determinations full faith and credit. This
full faith and credit aspect of the VAP process affords
greater administrative ease to the judicial system
and protects individual parental rights.19 Because
lesbian co-parents who cannot access second parent
adoptions need some form of legal protection that
transfers across state lines, access to the VAP process
could have significant and critical implications for
lesbian co-parents’ parental rights.
The VAP procedure consists of a hospitalbased program where an unmarried couple has
the option of signing an affidavit voluntarily
acknowledging paternity immediately before or after
the child’s birth. Some state VAP forms require that
the affidavits state that the parents have some reason
to believe that the male is the biological father.20
Additionally, VAPs serve as a judicial determination
of parentage and are very difficult to challenge later
in the child’s life. Typically, once both parents sign
a VAP, a court will overturn the determination of
parentage only if the male parent signed due to a
mother’s representation that amounts to fraud.21
In Andrew R. v. Arizona Dept. of Economic
Security, Andrew and Mother signed a VAP after
the birth of Isabella.22 Another man claiming
paternity over Isabella challenged the voluntary
acknowledgement of paternity. The court
determined that because Andrew R. and Isabella’s
mother signed the VAP, a judicial determination of
parentage stands despite evidence that another man
is Isabella’s actual biological father, and Andrew was
financially responsible for Isabella. The court noted
that after properly executed, a VAP in Arizona stands
unless challenged within 60 days on the basis of
fraud or duress. This case demonstrates the relative
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difficulty of dismissing a validly executed VAP after a
reasonable time period.
Although the state is often eager to find a
second parent to support a child to avoid financial
burden on the government, Andrew R. articulates
the burden an individual faces when challenging an
acknowledgement of paternity.23 Often, unless the
challenging party can prove fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact, the finding of parentage established
through a VAP stands.24 Additionally, in cases where
the child’s education and or custody is at issue,
rather than challenging child support orders, courts
will honor VAPs, even in the absence of a father’s
biological tie to the child.25 These cases demonstrate
that VAPs are difficult to overturn, and that a party
challenging parentage based on a VAP faces a high
burden.26 Cases where judges have overturned
parentage determinations often contain some finding
of duress or fraud.27
Historically, the VAP process has been closed
off to lesbian co-parents. In states that model their
VAP statute on the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA)
and require the non-biological parent to attest to a
belief of biological parenthood, lesbian co-parents
are unable to meet this requirement.28 The UPA is
not a desirable model for state VAP statutes because
its gender specific language forecloses the VAP
procedure for lesbian couples.29 Federal legislation
does not have this requirement, and the male parent
signing the VAP is not compelled to attest to being
the biological father.30 If a state limits access to VAPs
to situations where both parents have a reason to
believe the father signing the affidavit is the biological
father, they are not made available to a lesbian partner.
Lesbian partners cannot claim biological parentage
when her partner is the biological parent.31 However,
case law demonstrates that even when parents sign
a VAP with knowledge that the listed father is not
the child’s biological father, the VAP will be still be
honored.32 The father’s false affidavit typically does
not constitute fraud or coercion because even though
the man knows he is not the biological father, he still
signs the VAP to demonstrate his agreement to coparent.33
Accordingly, state legislatures should not
follow the UPA model and should instead allow two
adults to consent to parentage immediately before
or after the child’s birth, regardless of biological
parenthood. Additionally, I argue that when two
3

lesbians make the decision to co-parent, the nonbiological parent should have the same ability to
establish parentage as a similarly situated male so as
not to violate equal protection. Finally, access to VAPs
for both heterosexual and lesbian parents furthers
Congress’ policy considerations of establishing
parentage early in a child’s life and ensuring that
children have two parents responsible for their needs,
and therefore lesbian co-parents should have an
option to sign a VAP.34
III. Analysis
A. Voluntary Acknowledgements of Paternity are
appropriate for use within lesbian parenting units
because courts do not always rely on biology to
determine parentage.
VAPs are an appropriate method of
establishing parentage of a lesbian partner because
courts uphold VAPs even in instances where the
father signs the affidavit with knowledge that he is
not the biological father.35 Under the federal statute
governing VAPs, a man may voluntarily acknowledge
his paternity as long as the mother consents.36
Federal law does not require genetic testing before
a man has access to the VAP process, indicating that
the “acknowledged father” may not always be the
biological father.37 Similarly, if a non-biological lesbian
partner wishes to acknowledge parentage and the
biological mother consents, federal and state statutes
should allow the couple to utilize the VAP procedure
to legally establish parentage. In some states, under
the current VAP process, a man acknowledging
paternity must attest that he believes himself to be
the biological father.38 However, in practice, a man
can use the system to establish parentage even with
the knowledge that he is not the biological father.39
Because VAPs are extremely difficult to overturn,
a heterosexual couple can essentially consent to
parentage and bypass the judicial process, while
lesbian couples are not allowed the same convenience.
One argument against allowing homosexual
couples access to the VAP process is that these
couples may circumvent adoption by doing so. A
lesbian co-parent that signs a VAP, however, is not
circumventing second-parent adoption any more so
than a heterosexual male co-parent accessing the VAP
process. Both the female and the male co-parent are
4

establishing parentage without first proving a genetic
tie to the child or completing the adoption procedure.
Adoptions are intended to terminate one party’s legal
parental rights and grant those rights to another party
or in the case of second-parent adoption, establish
a second parent’s parental rights.40 In an Ohio case,
the court determined that a gestational surrogacy
agreement rebutted a presumption of parentage
when the birth mother did not want to abide by the
surrogacy contract.41 This situation is a more accurate
example of circumventing adoption.
In this case, the appellee, an unmarried
woman, contacted an Ohio clinic to find anonymous
sperm and egg donors and a surrogate in order to
fulfill a gestational surrogate pregnancy. The clinic
located the appellant surrogate and the two women
along with the appellee’s fiancé entered into a
surrogacy agreement naming the appellee as the
intended mother and the appellant as the surrogate.
According to the contract all parental rights and
responsibilities belonged to the appellee, and the
appellant agreed to relinquish all rights. When the
appellant challenged the surrogacy agreement and
tried to establish herself as the child’s legal mother,
the appellate court determined that the surrogacy
agreement trumped the birth mother’s rights.42 The
judge relied on Ohio’s Parentage Act and reasoned that
“appellee’s voluntary acknowledgment of maternity
is sufficient to rebut the presumption that appellant
is the child’s natural mother by reason of her having
given birth to the child.”43 This Ohio case, however,
is not representative of how the VAP process should
operate for lesbian couples, where in most cases the
lesbian co-parent would be establishing parentage of
her partner’s biological or birth child. Additionally,
because many states do not grant second parent
adoptions for same-sex co-parents, lesbian couples
may be in even more dire need for the VAP process
than heterosexual couples.44
In Chicago, Illinois a judge upheld a
VAP despite contradictory biological evidence. A
heterosexual couple that had dated in the past but
never married agreed to sign a VAP when Torres gave
birth in 2001.45 Torres tried to extinguish Huddleston’s
paternity despite the fact that Huddleston had acted
as a parent for two years, playing with the child,
changing diapers, and contributing to the child’s
financial needs. The Domestic Relations Judge
determined that the parties exhibited a clear and

THE MODERN AMERICAN

unambiguous intent to name Huddleston as father
of the child. Because both parties contributed to
the misrepresentation, the fact that the affidavit
was improperly signed was immaterial to the case.
Huddleston, though not the biological father, was
determined to have legal rights to the child.46 The
judge strongly considered Huddleston’s active role in
the child’s life for the preceding two years. The judge
reasoned that “both parties are participants in what
the court views as their clear, unambiguous intent
to denominate Mr. Huddleston as the parent of this
child,” and therefore the VAP must remain valid.47
A lesbian non-biological parent who intends
to act as a child’s parent should have the option of
legally establishing paternity through the use of a
VAP. If biology is not the determinative factor for
heterosexual couples that utilize the VAP process,
then biology alone should not bar a same-sex, nonbiological parent from accessing the VAP procedure.48
Even though the VAP system in some states is
premised on biological considerations, in practice,
a finding contrary to an attestation of biological
parenthood often does not void a VAP. As a result,
lesbian non-biological parents should have the same
access as heterosexual male parents.
The Supreme Court has also suggested that
biology is not the determinative factor in establishing
parentage. The Court held that the law does not
recognize the rights of biological parents claiming a
relationship to a child when a marital parental unit
exists. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., Michael sought
recognition as a dual father for a child born to a
woman with whom he was previously engaged in an
affair.49 Because the mother was married to Gerald at
the time of the child’s birth, Gerald had parental rights
because of California’s marital presumption.50 Even
though Michael maintained a parental relationship
with the child, Justice Scalia held that Michael’s
relationship with his daughter is not “an interest
traditionally protected by our society.”51 Michael,
therefore, was legally barred from being the child’s
father. While this case stands for the proposition of
privileging parental rights in marital relationships,
Michael H. also demonstrates that biology alone is
not the determinative factor granting custody. The
holding in Michael H. opposes a functional parenting
framework but still supports the proposition that
biology is not the ultimate threshold for parental
rights.52 Accordingly, the law should allow lesbian,
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non-biological parents parental rights even despite
the absence of a biological connection to the child.
Because biology is not determinative of the
validity of a VAP, states should eliminate the affidavit
of “believed biology” in their VAP statutes and
forms and instead adopt an affidavit that establishes
the signing parent expects and consents to act as
a parent to the child assuming all the rights and
responsibilities that accompany parentage. Parentage
should reflect a functional parenting framework
rather than a biological parenthood requirement.
Functional parenthood applies when a person acts as
a parent without being a child’s biological parent. A
person who has a relationship with the child, cares
for the child, and supports the child while not having
a biological relationship to the child is an example of
a functional parent.53
As familial make-ups in society continue to
change and expand, legislatures and judges are more
willing to define, create, and interpret family law in
ways that do not only consider biology.54 Courts
that are willing to liberally interpret the definition of
parenthood and family have increasingly looked to
what is in the child’s best interests when paternity is
challenged.55 For example, a father who has acted as a
child’s parent and then finds genetic proof that he is
not the father may still have parental responsibilities
to that child.56 If a court finds that the father has
sufficiently acted as a parent and established a
continued relationship with the child, then the court
may determine that maintaining that parent-child
relationship is in the best interests of the child.
Instead of relying primarily on biology, judges should
be more willing to consider the functional parenting
of the parent and make a determination that prefers
relationships to genetics.
B. Denying Voluntary Acknowledgements of
Paternity to a non-biological parent in a lesbian
couple unconstitutionally discriminates on the
basis of gender and therefore violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Denying a non-biological lesbian partner the
option of signing a VAP violates equal protection
because similarly situated male, heterosexual parents
are allowed to sign a VAP and the discrimination is
not substantially related to the important government
interest. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United
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States Constitution provides that “no state shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”57 Because a male that is not a
child’s biological father is able to sign a VAP without
first genetically establishing paternity, a similarly
situated female must have the same opportunity.
Therefore, a non-biological lesbian parent who
wants to establish paternity through a VAP must be
afforded that option in order for a state’s VAP statute
to satisfy equal protection.
Laws that differentiate based on the parent’s
gender will not survive equal protection challenges
unless the laws satisfy intermediate scrutiny.58 To
stand, the law must serve an important government
interest and the law must be substantially related to
that interest.59 In cases where states create parenting
statutes that differentiate based on gender, the
Supreme Court may invalidate those statutes if
they do not satisfy intermediate scrutiny. In Caban
v. Mohammed, a New York law gave mothers the
absolute right to consent to adoption.60 Caban,
the father, and Mohammed, the mother, had two
children together but never married. After the
couple separated, Caban petitioned for adoption of
the children, and Mohammed cross-petitioned. The
court granted Mohammed custody based on the
New York Domestic Relations statute that allows
an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to block
their child’s adoption by withholding her consent. The
Supreme Court held that the sex-based distinction
between unwed mothers and unwed fathers in the
New York statute violated the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because it bore no
substantial relation to any important state interest.61
Similarly, in Stanley v. Illinois, the Supreme
Court struck down an Illinois statute that made
children of unwed parents wards of the State upon
their mothers’ death.62 Stanley, a biological and
functional parent for his four children, challenged the
law when the state placed his children in the care of
court appointed guardians after their mother died.
Stanley’s parental rights were effectively terminated,
despite other statutory provisions that required a
showing of unfitness to terminate parental rights.63
Because the court never proved that Stanley was an
unfit parent, rather, it discriminated against him on
the basis of his status as an unwed-father, Stanley
argued that the state statute violated the equal
protection clause. The Court held that the Illinois
6

law violated equal protection because removing a
child from an unwed father after the mother’s death,
when the father had an existing relationship with the
children, did not further the state’s interest of having
children cared for by fit parents.64
Based on the holdings in Caban and Stanley,
state legislatures should create VAP statutes that
refuse to differentiate on the basis of gender. VAP
statutes that preference male parents over female
parents violate equal protection if they do not
meet intermediate scrutiny because the gender
distinction is not substantially related to an important
government interest. If the government’s interest is
administrative ease and establishing parentage early
in a child’s life when an unwed mother gives birth, a
VAP statute that only allows male parents to establish
parentage is not substantially related to that interest.
Such a statute would likely meet rational basis review
but is under-inclusive and fails to satisfy the higher
level of scrutiny required when analyzing laws that
discriminate on the basis of gender. However, when
a lesbian mother is impregnated and gives birth by
means of artificial insemination, there is likely no
male that will claim parentage at the child’s birth.
There could, however, be a female co-parent who
wants to establish parentage. As both a legal and
policy matter, VAP statutes should not deny access to
female co-parents.
In Nguyen v. INS, however, Nguyen challenged
the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).65 This
section of the U.S. Code governs the acquisition
of U.S. citizenship of a child born to unmarried
parents when only one parent is a U.S. citizen. The
statute has different requirements for granting a child
citizenship depending on whether the citizen parent
is the mother or the father; the law makes it much
more difficult for a citizen father to confer his U.S.
citizenship to his child. The Supreme Court held that
the statute survived intermediate scrutiny because
although it involved classifications based on gender
– raising the burden of the father above the burden
of the mother – the law also achieved important
government objectives of ensuring that the father
is biologically related to the child and that the child
and parent have everyday ties.66 There is no need for
the statute to impose these additional requirements
on the mother because she necessarily will be with
the child at birth and is guaranteed an opportunity
to establish a relationship with the child. Nguyen,
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therefore, provides an example of where the Court
held that a gender-based parentage classification
did not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution and that a priority for biological ties is
an important state interest.67
Still, Nguyen does not unequivocally support
gender-based classifications based on biology. In the
VAP situation, both a father and a lesbian co-parent
both have the potential to lack biological ties to
the child. Signing a VAP affirms that the co-parent
agrees to accept parental rights and responsibilities
associated with the child, regardless of biology. The
need to establish and promote biological ties is not
furthered by excluding a co-parent when a biological
mother is unmarried and consents to sharing parental
rights with another parent.
Although Nguyen does establish that a genderbased classification in parentage determinations is
acceptable to uphold certain governmental interests,
the VAP process does not reflect one of those
instances where a distinction is justified. In support
of the gender-based distinction in the VAP process,
the government might claim that it has an interest
in providing a child with a father rather than simply a
second parent.68 Government and society’s preference
for a two parent, opposite gender household is often
premised on the notion that this is a healthier, more
stable environment where children will grow up to
understand and conform to their established gender
roles.69 Such a justification, however, is not a valid
reason to place an unconstitutional gender-based
distinction on parentage determinations.70 Most
distinctions between a father and a second parent
would be based on stereotypes and are, therefore, not
legitimate government interests that will satisfy equal
protection.71
In the context of the VAP process, if a nonbiological male can consent to parentage through
the VAP process, then in order to satisfy equal
protection, a non-biological female should have the
same access to the VAP procedure. While Congress
and state legislatures may have intended states only
to use VAPs in cases where an unwed mother can
identify a potential biological father, in reality the
statutes are often not used in that way and the finding
of parentage is still upheld. In In the Matter of J.B.
and J.G., J.B. was listed on the child’s birth certificate
and signed an affidavit of paternity.72 After a
disagreement regarding the child’s schooling, J.B. filed
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in family court to establish his parental rights, and J.G.
responded by alleging that J.B. was not the biological
father and therefore did not have any parental rights.73
The court determined that despite genetic testing
that confirmed that J.B. was not biologically related
to the child, overturning a previously established
determination of parentage would be inconsistent
with the legislature’s intent.74 The court reasoned that
because biology is not the sole avenue to establish
parentage, the legislature intended for an expansive
definition of parent.75 Because J.B. correctly followed
procedure to establish himself as a parent under the
law, his lack of a biological relationship to the child
did not bar him from enjoying the same parental
rights to care and make decisions for the child as the
mother.76 Accordingly, state VAP statutes should not
differentiate based on the co-parent’s gender and lack
of biological ties to the child and should allow lesbian
parents to access the VAP process.
C. Use of Voluntary Acknowledgements of Paternity
within lesbian parenting couples furthers Congress’
original policy considerations in enacting the federal
VAP statute.
Allowing same-sex couples access to VAPs
furthers Congress’ original policy considerations to
create judicial and administrative ease in determining
a child’s parentage and allow for efficient collection
of child support funds.77 In a child support system
based on legal paternity rather than biology, allowing
a co-parent to establish parentage early in the child’s
life identifies another adult who is responsible for
financially supporting the child. To further this goal,
federal law states that after the 60-day rescission
period, the parties may only challenge a VAP on the
basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake.78 Once
the parties have identified a second legal, financially
responsible parent, Congress does not allow the
parties to rescind the finding arbitrarily. By making
the process of invalidating a VAP more difficult,
the government can collect child support more
efficiently because the parties have already consented
to being financial responsible for the child. If the
couple separates before the child reaches the age of
majority, or the couple chooses to never maintain a
relationship, the parties will have already established
paternity through the VAP process, and a judicial
hearing to determine paternity will not be necessary
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for the government to determine which individuals
are responsible for paying child support.
In some jurisdictions, if a custodial parent
requires government assistance, the government
will reimburse itself by enforcing a child support
order against the other biological parent (District
of Columbia operates this way). First, however, the
government must find this individual, and spends
public resources doing so. If a second parent can
establish paternity through the VAP process, the
co-parent responsible for financially supporting the
child has already been identified, and the government
will not have to expend resources ascertaining the
second responsible parent.79 Allowing all couples,
regardless of sexual orientation, to access the VAP
process would relieve the government of the burden
of soliciting personal information on a child’s other
parent from a birth mother on public assistance.
Additionally, the court system would also
be freed from the burden of judicially establishing
the paternity of the other responsible parent. The
VAP process, as it was intended, already allows
heterosexual parents to consent to a judicial finding
of paternity. Allowing both heterosexual and lesbian
couples access to this system permits the government
to identify a co-parent in an additional situation
where the parents are willing to consent to a judicial
finding of paternity, thereby furthering Congress’
goal of creating administrative ease and efficient
collection of child support. 80 Parents and children
would be best served and legally protected, and the
government’s objectives of administrative efficiency
would be met, if state legislatures allow same-sex
parents to consent to parentage through a VAP just
as heterosexual, unmarried parents are allowed.
IV. Conclusion
Congress created the VAP system to allow
unwed mothers the opportunity to establish the
paternity of a father at the child’s birth with relative
simplicity. Such a system relieves both the judicial and
administrative agencies of the burden of determining
who are – or should be – a child’s parents. Although
no states currently allow same-sex couples access to
the VAP process, legislatures should open the VAP
system to same-sex couples. In practice, biology is
not the controlling factor for upholding paternity, and
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therefore, biology should not be the determinative
criteria for allowing access to the VAP process.
Additionally, allowing a similarly situated man access
to the system but denying that same access to a woman
violates equal protection; the government interests
Congress identified are not substantially related to
the gender discrimination in the VAP system. Finally,
to satisfy Congress’ goals of establishing parentage
and allowing for ease in collecting child support,
lesbian couples should have access to a system that
easily creates a judicial determination of parentage.
If two adults agree to co-parent and the mother is
willing to consent to parentage, access to the VAP
system creates ease for the government, the parents,
and the child, and as a matter of public policy, the
system should be accessible to both heterosexual and
lesbian couples.
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LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS FACING NONIMMIGRANTS
ENTERING LICENSED PROFESSIONS
By Justin Storch1

In 2005, Karen LeClerc, Guillame Jarry,
Beatrice Boulord, Maureen Affleck, Caroline Wallace,
and Emily Maw sought admission to the Louisiana
Bar.2 Emily Maw, a graduate of Tulane University
Law School, and the others, who were graduates
of law schools outside the United States, were all in
the United States legally on J-1 or H-1B visas.3 J-1
visas allow participants in exchange-visitor programs
to travel to the United States, whereas H-1B visas
provide opportunities for foreign workers in specialty
occupations to work in the United States.
Despite their good academic standing, and
the fact that Emily Maw possessed a U.S. law degree,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in LeClerc v. Webb upheld a Louisiana Supreme
Court rule prohibiting these foreign born individuals
from taking the Louisiana Bar due to their lack of
legal permanent resident (LPR) status.4 LPR status is
given to immigrants with the right to reside in the U.S.
permanently. In denying non-LPRs from taking the
bar examination, the State of Louisiana denied them
an opportunity to practice law in the state, denied
Louisiana employers an opportunity to hire them
(as well as other U.S. employers who need attorneys
barred in Louisiana), and denied U.S. citizens in need
of legal services from utilizing and benefitting from
their legal skills and knowledge.
Had any of these individuals been LPRs,
they would have been allowed to take the Louisiana
bar exam. The rule regarding LPRs and licensure
exams finds its origins in In Re Griffiths, where in
1973 the Supreme Court invalidated a Connecticut
law that prohibited non-U.S. citizens from taking
the Connecticut bar exam.5 Since then, states have
not been able to discriminate against LPRs seeking
licensure in their respective professions.
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If states cannot deny LPRs an opportunity
to take the tests required for licensure, why were the
plaintiffs in LeClerc denied the same opportunity?
Despite the ruling in Griffiths, some states, such
as Louisiana, have continued to limit licensing
procedures and also deny licensure to certain classes
of immigrants. These states draw a distinction
between LPRs and those foreign nationals “admitted
temporarily and for a specific purpose,” referred to as
nonimmigrants.6 But courts have differed on whether
to permit such a distinction. While the LeClerc court
upheld the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision,
barring nonimmigrants from taking licensing exams,
the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York invalidated a similarly
restrictive law in Adusumelli v. Steiner.7 In Adusumelli,
a New York education law limited U.S. citizens and
LPRs to be licensed as pharmacists, leading a group
of 26 nonimmigrant plaintiffs to file suit.8 The court
overturned the law and allowed the nonimmigrant
plaintiffs to take the licensing exams.9
The Adusumellli court provides a model that
other courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, should
follow. Courts should not use the distinction between
LPRs and nonimmigrants to deny foreign nationals
the opportunity to enter licensed professions in the
U.S. Nonimmigrants with the necessary skills and
knowledge to successfully enter professions such as
law, medicine, and engineering should be encouraged
to enter the U.S. market without unnecessary and
irrational barriers.
This article argues that federal immigration
law preempts state laws that prohibit nonimmigrants
from taking state licensing exams. These state
laws occupy the field of immigrant employment
authorization, which is the domain of the federal
government. In doing so, they stand as an obstacle to
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the federal government’s decision regarding a foreign
national’s admission into the U.S., placing conditions
upon U.S. residency that are absent from federal law.
Furthermore, under an equal protection analysis,
there is no significant distinction between immigrants
and nonimmigrants, and therefore, all classifications
based on alienage should be subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.
Part I of this article describes the distinction
between immigrants and nonimmigrants, explaining
the reasoning and distinctions that states have used to
justify the denial of licensure to nonimmigrants. Parts
II and III discuss the legal issues regarding professional
licensing for immigrants and nonimmigrants,
respectively. Parts II and II also include a discussion
of the Griffiths, LeClerc and Adusumelli decisions
and their impact on federal immigration law. Part
IV outlines the policy implications of a distinction
between immigrants and nonimmigrants in state
licensing procedures. Specifically, Part IV discusses
the harm done to nonimmigrants, U.S. employers,
and the U.S. as a whole, when laws, regulations, and
court decisions deny nonimmigrants the opportunity
to enter licensed professions. Part V is a legal
analysis of the distinction between immigrants and
nonimmigrants. This section applies legal tests to
examine how federal law preempts restrictive state
licensure laws, and argues for similar preemption
during an equal protection analysis. Part VI concludes
the article, and argues for the elimination of state
licensure laws that prohibit nonimmigrants from
obtaining licensure.
I. DISTINCTION BETWEEN IMMIGRANTS
AND NONIMMIGRANTS
The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) groups foreign nationals seeking to enter the
U.S. into two broad categories: nonimmigrants and
immigrants. Nonimmigrants are foreign nationals
that are “admitted temporarily and for a specific
purpose.”10 Several categories of foreign nationals
fall into the broader category of nonimmigrants,
including temporary workers, students, foreign
diplomats, tourists, and business travelers.11 The
complete list of nonimmigrant visa classifications is
set forth in the subsections of Section 101(a)(15) of
the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA).12
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Nonimmigrants are restricted both on the
amount of time they can be present in the United
States, and the activities in which they can participate.13
For instance, a nonimmigrant admitted on a student
visa does not have unfettered work authorization, as
the individual is limited to the practical training that
relates to the nonimmigrant’s student visa. Moreover,
a nonimmigrant admitted as a temporary worker does
not have authorization to attend a university.
Generally, nonimmigrants must express their
intent to stay in the U.S. only for a short period of
time. However, the U.S. Department of State (State
Department) has recognized a doctrine of “dual
intent” for certain classes of nonimmigrants.14 After
the Immigration Act of 1990, the State Department
concluded that Congress should eliminate
nonimmigrant intent as a factor in adjudicating
applications for H-1 visas, which are used by
temporary workers in specialty occupations, and L
visas, which are used by intra-company transferees.15
Thus, an applicant in either visa category can come to
the U.S. in nonimmigrant status, while simultaneously
pursuing permanent residence status.
The INA defines “immigrants” as “every alien
except an alien who is within one of the . . . classes
of nonimmigrant aliens” listed in Section 101(a)(15).16
Under Section 214(b) of the INA, immigration officials
must presume that all foreign nationals entering the
U.S. intend to immigrate to the U.S. permanently. But
this intention is not presumed for those entering the
U.S. in the L, V, and H-1 visa categories.17 Thus, all
foreign nationals entering the U.S. as legal permanent
residents (LPRs) are immigrants.
II. LICENSING AND IMMIGRANTS (LEGAL
PERMANENT RESIDENTS)
In the 1886 landmark case of Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court allowed Chinese
immigrants to bring an equal protection challenge
against a San Francisco laundry ordinance, which was
being discriminately enforced against them.18 The
14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits
states from denying equal protection under U.S. law
to persons within the several states.19 In Yick Wo, the
Court established that lawfully present resident aliens
were considered “persons” within the meaning of the
equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.20
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In Graham v. Richardson, in determining
whether the states of Arizona and Pennsylvania could
deny government assistance to resident aliens, the
Court went a step further than the Yick Wo Court. It
declared, “classifications based on alienage, like those
based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect
and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”21 In Graham, the
states posited that they had a “special public interest”
in distribution of government resources toward its
own citizens.22 The Court rejected this argument,
noting that resident aliens also pay taxes, and that “[t]
here can be no ‘special public interest’ in tax revenues
to which aliens have contributed on an equal basis
with the residents of the State.”23
In 1973, the Court in In re Griffiths
specifically addressed the question of state licensing
laws for LPRs. In Griffiths, an LPR with citizenship
in the Netherlands satisfied all the qualifications for
admission to the Connecticut bar, except for the
requirement that an applicant had to be a U.S. citizen
to be admitted to the bar.24 The Court again applied
strict judicial scrutiny, and emphasized that because
resident aliens pay taxes, may serve in the Armed
Forces, and contribute to society in a variety of ways,
they should not be denied the opportunity to become
licensed professionals.25 Thus, the Court placed a
heavy burden on states in justifying the denial of
employment opportunities based on alienage.26
The Griffiths Court noted that states have a
legitimate interest in ensuring that those admitted
to the bar meet “the character and general fitness
requisite for an attorney and counselor-at-law.”27
However, the Court found that the character and
general fitness requirements were not used by the
state of Connecticut to exclude bar membership
for foreign nationals.28 Instead, the state justified the
exclusion by noting that foreign nationals may have a
divided allegiance to the U.S. that would impede their
ability to carry out certain duties, such as signing writs
and subpoenas, and administering oaths.29
The Court found the state’s “divided
allegiance” argument unconvincing. The decision
noted that these duties “hardly involve matters of
state policy or acts of such unique responsibility as
to entrust them only to citizens.”30 Furthermore, the
Court opined that although some resident aliens may
be unsuited for the bar, it does not justify a wholesale
exclusion of resident aliens.31 In the Court’s opinion,
the continued scrutiny attorneys face once admitted
14

to the bar, such as sanctions and disbarment, would
reduce unethical behavior in resident alien attorneys.32
The Court has applied the same reasoning
from Griffiths in other cases, prohibiting states from
limiting access to professions based on alienage. In
Sugarman v. Dougall, the Court struck down a New
York state law that limited the appointment of
competitive civil service jobs to U.S. citizens, and
excluded aliens.33 Likewise, in Examining Board of
Engineers v. Flores de Otero, the Court struck down a
Puerto Rican law that limited the granting of civil
engineering private practice licenses to U.S. citizens.34
The Court has delineated two exceptions to
the general rule that states cannot deny employment
opportunities based on alienage. First, the Court has
recognized that states can have a legitimate interest
in limiting the access to employment that serves a
political and governmental function to U.S. Citizens.35
For instance, in Foley v. Connelie, the Court upheld a
New York state law that permitted only U.S citizens
to be employed by the state police force.36 Second, a
state may deny employment opportunities to those
who are not lawfully present in the U.S.37 For example,
in DeCanas v. Bica, the Court upheld a California
law imposing criminal sanctions on employers
who knowingly employ immigrants without work
authorization, which result in fewer employers willing
to hire undocumented workers.38
III. LICENSING AND NONIMMIGRANTS
While the Supreme Court has struck
down laws that prohibit non-citizens from entering
licensed professions, it has never directly addressed
the issue of whether states may distinguish between
immigrants and nonimmigrants in their licensure
procedures. However, lower courts have addressed
the issue and have reached varied conclusions.
In LeClerc, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit considered a Louisiana Supreme Court
rule that restricted the admission of U.S. citizens and
resident aliens to the Louisiana bar.39 The Louisiana
Supreme Court in In Re Bourke, interpreted the phrase
“resident alien” to include “only . . . those aliens who
have attained permanent resident status in the United
States.”40 Challenging this decision, the plaintiffs in
LeClerc claimed that the Court in Griffiths, in applying
strict judicial scrutiny to a law affecting LPRs,
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supported the proposition that all immigrants were a
suspect class (a class for which all laws discriminating
against the class are inherently suspect) and, therefore,
the Louisiana rule is subject to strict scrutiny.41 This
line of reason follows from the Graham court’s
reasoning that it is inherently suspect for a law to uses
classifications based on alienage and, therefore, such
laws should be subject to strict scrutiny.42
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the plaintiffs,
stating that nonimmigrants “are not a suspect class
under Griffiths.”43 The court noted a “paramount”
distinction between the plaintiffs in LeClerc and the
plaintiffs in Griffiths, as the former was a group of
nonimmigrants and the latter was a group of LPRs.44
The court noted that nonimmigrants “ordinarily
stipulate before entry to this country that they have
no intention of abandoning their native citizenship.”45
In the eyes of the court, nonimmigrants are not
“similarly situated” to U.S. citizens in the way that
permanent residents are because of their temporary
connection to the U.S. Because of this temporary
and dissimilar connection, nonimmigrants are not
entitled to strict judicial scrutiny.46 The court upheld
the Louisiana rule applying rational basis review.47
The Adusumelli court reached a different
conclusion.48 In Adusumelli v. Steiner, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York
considered a New York education law that limited the
ability of U.S. citizens and permanent residents to be
licensed as pharmacists.49 The twenty-six plaintiffs in
Adusumelli were nonimmigrant pharmacists residing
in the U.S., either with H-1B visas or “TN” temporary
worker status (a status created by the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for citizens of
Canada and Mexico).50
The Adusumelli court found that the state
law interfered with federal immigration power
reserved for Congress in the U.S. Constitution
through the Naturalization Clause, which gives
Congress the power to “establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization”, and the Supremacy Clause, which
states that the Constitution and other federal laws
will be the supreme law of the land.51 The state
argued that Congress explicitly gave states discretion
in this field through 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(v)(A),
which states that “[i]f an occupation requires a state
or local license for an individual to fully perform
the duties of the occupation, an alien . . . seeking [a
temporary work visa] in that occupation must have
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that license prior to approval of the petition.”52 The
court, however, concluded that this merely outlines a
division of labor, finding that the federal government
determines admissibility, while the state determines
professional competence.53
The State of New York, referencing LeClerc,
noted that legal permanent residents pay taxes,
can serve in the military, and can work in the U.S.
indefinitely, whereas other foreign nationals have
less in common with U.S. citizens.54 The state argued
that the plaintiffs, therefore, were not entitled to
strict scrutiny in an equal protection analysis.55 The
court noted, however, that nonimmigrants are largely
subject to the same tax rules as U.S. citizens, at least
in regards to their U.S. income.56
Additionally, the Adusumelli court referenced
the doctrine of dual intent.57 This doctrine allows
holders of certain classes of visas to pursue
permanent residence while residing in the U.S. as a
nonimmigrant. Regarding this doctrine, the court
noted that nonimmigrants are not as transient as
other courts have characterized them to be, and that
many nonimmigrants are in the process of applying
for green cards.58 The Supreme Court’s decision
in Nyquist v. Mauclet, played a pivotal role in the
Adusumelli court’s reasoning regarding the somewhat
transient nature of nonimmigrants.59 In Nyquist, the
Supreme Court considered a New York law that
denied financial assistance for higher education to
those who had not applied for citizenship, or did not
intend to do so once eligible.60 The Supreme Court
applied strict scrutiny in invalidating the law, and
rejected the practice of discriminating against foreign
nationals on the basis of transience.61
Furthermore, the Adusumelli decision noted
that nonimmigrants are no less likely to be the victim of
irrational discrimination than their LPR counterparts;
in fact, they are more likely to be discriminated
against.62 The court noted that when a group is subject
to such irrational discrimination, courts usually apply
at least heightened, or intermediate, scrutiny.63 The
court found that denial of an opportunity to obtain
a pharmacist’s license triggers at least intermediate
scrutiny, and that is was unnecessary to determine
whether to apply intermediate or strict scrutiny
because the law would fail at either level.64 The court
found that the state was unable to show that there
were “important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed [were] substantially
15

related to the achievement of those objectives,” as
required in intermediate scrutiny cases.65
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
IMMIGRANT/NONIMMIGRANT
LICENSING DISTINCTION
Restrictive state licensure laws deny
opportunities to highly educated and qualified foreign
workers, who not only benefit the U.S. workforce,
but also the nation as a whole. Congress did not
create multiple categories of nonimmigrant work
visas haphazardly. For instance, with the H-1B visa,
Congress intentionally promoted the inclusion of
highly educated and qualified foreign nationals into
the U.S. workforce. The H-1B classification is a visa
category that allows foreign nationals who work in
“specialty occupations” to seek employment in the
U.S.66 The law defines a “specialty occupation” as one
that requires a “theoretical and practical application
of a body of highly specialized knowledge,” and a
bachelor’s degree or its equivalent.67 While full-state
licensure is required to practice in a specific state,
the law does not permit states to create separate
requirements or deny licenses based on alienage.68
In determining whether foreign nationals
should be able to work in the U.S., either on a
temporary or permanent basis, Congress evaluated
the costs and benefits of immigration. Regarding
licensed professions, foreign nationals must meet the
same requirements of licensure as other U.S. citizens;
however, there is no indication that Congress intended
for foreign nationals to meet additional requirements.
Furthermore,
when
state
licensing
requirements for foreign nationals are not uniform,
the inconsistency creates uncertainty for foreign
nationals who wish to enter a licensed profession.
Numerous professions require licensure to practice
in multiple states, but because of the varied nature
of state licensure recruitments, a foreign national
admitted to practice in one state may be ineligible
in another. Likewise, a foreign national who wishes
to transfer jobs once in the U.S., could face barriers
that U.S. citizens and permanent residents do not
encounter. For instance, an attorney with an H-1B
visa practicing law in New York would not be able to
transfer to a job in Louisiana, regardless if the attorney
had the knowledge and skill necessary to pass the
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Louisiana bar. Essentially, these requirements reduce
the freedom of nonimmigrants, and discourage
foreign nationals from accepting new employment or
changing jobs.
Proponents of restrictive licensure laws
contend that licensed professionals who are non-U.S.
citizens, or are LPRs, are more likely to be transient,
and are likely to leave their job after a relatively short
period of time and return to their native country.
To mitigate these concerns regarding transience,
U.S. immigration policy should encourage licensed
professionals to remain in the U.S. With dual intent
visas, such as H-1B and L-1 visas, even nonimmigrants
have a way to become citizens, which reduces the risk
of transience. While some professionals may come
to the U.S. without the intent to remain permanently,
immigration policy should balance the risk of
transience against the benefits these foreign nationals
could provide during their temporary employment.
These benefits, although temporary, greatly outweigh
the negative effects of transience.
Domestic employers benefit tremendously
from their ability to hire the best professionals from
around the world. Likewise, the nation as a whole
benefits from being able to obtain high quality
professional services, and arbitrary obstacles based
on the nationality and immigration status only
hinders this ability. Thus, states should not only
permit foreign nationals to apply for such licensure,
they should encourage it.
V. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMMIGRANT/
NONIMMIGRANT DISTINCTION
A. Federal immigration law supersedes state laws
that prohibit nonimmigrants from entering licensed
professions
As the Adusumelli court noted, the federal
government has sole power to implement U.S.
immigration policy. As previously stated, this power
comes from the U.S. Constitution through the
Naturalization Clause, and the Supremacy Clause.69
Various courts have used the DeCanas tests, which
is described below, to determine whether federal
law preempts a state law that affects immigration.
Although the Adusumelli court referred to the DeCanas
case and tests, and reached a conclusion in harmony
with the tests, it did so without explicitly applying
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them. This section will analyze and apply the DeCanas
tests to the immigrant/nonimmigrant distinction.
DeCanas Tests
In League of United Latin American Citizens
v. Wilson (LULAC), the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California reviewed a voterapproved initiative. The initiative gave state officials
the authority to verify the immigration status of
people with whom they come in contact, and deny
health care, education, and other benefits based
on their determination.70 In determining whether
the initiative at issue in LULAC was preempted by
federal law, the District Court looked to the Supreme
Court case of DeCanas v. Bica.71 In DeCanas, migrant
farm workers in California challenged a state law
that placed criminal sanctions upon employers who
knowingly employed undocumented immigrants, if
such employment adversely affected lawful resident
workers.72
The Court in DeCanas proffered three tests
to assist in their analysis of the state law. The first
DeCanas test requires a court to determine whether
the state action is a “regulation of immigration.”73 The
DeCanas Court defines “regulation of immigration”
as “essentially a determination of who should or
should not be admitted into the country, and the
conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.”74
However, not all state regulations that affect
immigrants are “regulations of immigration.”75 For
example, in DeCanas, the Court dealt with a California
law that imposed criminal sanctions on employers
who knowingly hired immigrants without legal work
authorization. This was found to be a regulation
of employment, not a pre-empted “regulation of
immigration.”76
The second DeCanas test, requires a court to
determine whether “Congress intended to ‘occupy the
field’ which the statute attempts to regulate.”77 Even
if the state law is not a “regulation of immigration,”
it may nevertheless be preempted if it occupies a field
Congress has claimed for itself.78 The DeCanas Court
concluded that, for a state law to be preempted, the
“clear and manifest purpose” of Congress must
be “complete ouster of state power including state
power to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal
laws.”79
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The third DeCanas test requires the court to
determine if a state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.”80 This test was fashioned
by the Supreme Court in Hines v. Davidowitz.81 In Hines,
the Court examined a Pennsylvania law that set up a
state level immigrant registration scheme, which had
registration, information disclosure, and identification
requirements for aliens beyond what was required
by federal law.82 The Court decided that federal law
preempted the Pennsylvania law because the federal
government had exercised its constitutional authority
to implement the standards for alien registration and
states could not add to these requirements.83
1. State licensure laws survive the first
DeCanas test, because they are not
regulations of immigration.
As noted above, a “regulation of
immigration” is “essentially a determination of who
should or should not be admitted into the country,
and the conditions under which a legal entrant
may remain.”84 However, if the state law primarily
affects another field other than immigration, it is
not considered a regulation of immigration.85 This
was the case in DeCanas, where the state sanctioned
employers rather than determining the admission
status of the immigrant, or altering the conditions
under which an immigrant may remain in the
U.S.86 The Court described the California law as
having a “purely speculative and indirect impact on
immigration.”87 In contrast, the LULAC court stated
that to require a state official to question arrestees,
applicants for state welfare benefits, students, and
parents of students regarding their immigration
status, was a regulation of immigration.88 The court
found that the primary purpose of the initiative was
to place limitations on foreign nationals, and that
federal law explicitly allows these individuals to enter
and remain in the U.S. Accordingly, the court held
that federal law preempted the state initiative.
State licensure laws that limit licensure to U.S.
citizens and LPRs more closely resemble the state law
at issue in DeCanas, rather than the initiative at issue
in LULAC. Like DeCanas, state licensure laws do not
specifically place conditions on who may remain in
the U.S., rather these laws place regulations only on
employment. The aim of state licensing bodies is to
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ensure that those who receive professional licenses
meet the profession’s minimum qualifications and
standards. Because this is a permissible state function,
the fact that immigration status is a factor that a
licensing body may find relevant, nevertheless does
not make it a regulation of immigration.
One might argue that like the initiative
in LULAC, prohibitive state licensing laws place
conditions on those who may remain in the U.S. and,
thus, fail the first DeCanas test. However, the aim of
the state licensing bodies is not to determine who
may or may not enter or remain in the country. The
licensing bodies’ only concern is with the standards
for admission into the various professions. Thus,
while an argument comparing state licensing laws
to LULAC is interesting, it is likely not compelling
enough to invalidate these state licensure laws.
2. Prohibitive state licensure laws fail
the second DeCanas test, as Congress
intended to occupy the field of
immigrant admissions.
The second DeCanas test notes that federal
law preempts state or local law, regardless of whether
it is a “regulation of immigration,” if Congress
intended to “occupy the field” that the state law seeks
to regulate.89 Under this test, federal law preempts
state law only if Congress’s clear and manifest
purpose is a complete ouster of state regulatory
power within the field.90
In DeCanas, the Court noted that states have
“broad authority under their police powers to regulate
the employment relationship to protect workers
within the State.”91 Therefore, the state in DeCanas had
the power to ensure that California employers would
not employ those individuals not lawfully authorized
to work in the U.S.92 The Court found no compelling
evidence that Congress, through the INA, intended
to oust state powers to regulate employment to
ensure a lawful workforce.93 Therefore, the California
law survived the second DeCanas test.94
State licensure laws are distinguishable from
DeCanas in this regard. State licensing bodies have the
authority to determine the standards for admission
to a profession. This is a different type of authority
than the police power at issue in DeCanas. The state in
DeCanas merely determined whether employees met
federal standards for lawful employment, whereas
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state licensure boards create standards for admission
at the state level to various professions.
It is evident that the federal government
sought to occupy the field of immigrant admissions.
The federal government determines what the
standards and requirements are for admission to the
U.S. through a nonimmigrant visa, and adjudicates
individuals on a case-by-case basis. For instance,
with H-1B visas, Congress has determined the
qualifications necessary to work in the U.S. in a
specialty occupation.95 While state licensure is
required prior to issuance of a visa, the Adusumelli
court correctly noted a division of labor.96 The federal
government retains its domain over determinations
of admissibility, and the state government determines
professional competence.97
3. Prohibitive state licensure rules violate
the third DeCanas test as they stand
as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.
Under the third DeCanas test, federal
immigration law preempts state and local regulations
when they are found to be obstacles to “the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.”98 The LULAC court
stated this test somewhat differently, noting there is
preemption if state laws conflict with federal law, and
compliance with both is impossible.99 The Court in
Hines v. Davidowitz utilized this compliance test.
In Hines, the Court struck down annual
registration and state identification requirements,
because the federal government has its own uniform
registration and identification requirements.100
Similarly, the classification, notification, and
cooperation/reporting provisions of the initiative
at issue in LULAC, violated the third DeCanas test,
because they conflicted with federal deportation
laws.101 Furthermore, federal law preempted
provisions of the LULAC initiative that denied state
benefits to immigrants when state officials reasonably
suspected that an immigrant was not lawfully present.
The Court held that the initiative was preempted
because a state official’s “reasonable suspicion” is not
the same as verification under federal law.102
Similarly, prohibitive state licensure laws
directly conflict with federal immigration policy,
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and are in violation of the third DeCanas test. The
federal government determines whether foreign
nationals meet the requirements to work in the U.S.
through nonimmigrant work visas. This includes
a determination of whether these individuals
are qualified to practice in the specific specialty
occupation. And generally, one of the requirements
for foreign nationals to obtain employment is to
first become licensed by the state in their particular
field. Thus, a foreign national must be able to
take bar exams, medical licensing exams, etc. to
determine admissibility. When a state determines
that nonimmigrants are ineligible to take such an
exam, the state stands as an obstacle to the federal
government’s determination of admissibility.
B. There is no significant distinction between
immigrants and nonimmigrants for purposes of
equal protection analysis and strict scrutiny should
also apply to laws affecting nonimmigrants.
As noted above, the Supreme Court in Yick
Wo determined that legally present resident aliens are
“persons” for the purpose of an equal protection
analysis.103 Furthermore, classifications based on
alienage are subject to strict judicial scrutiny, and the
Court will apply this strict scrutiny to laws affecting
LPRs.104
Despite the Supreme Court’s application of
strict scrutiny to alienage classifications, during an
equal protection analysis the LeClerc court drew a
distinction between immigrants and nonimmigrants.105
The Adusumelli court disagreed with the LeClerc court,
noting that nonimmigrants are generally subject to the
same federal income tax rules as their LPR and U.S.
citizen counterparts.106 Furthermore, the doctrine
of dual intent allows certain nonimmigrants to seek
permanent residence in the U.S., while residing in the
U.S. on temporary visas.107
The Adusumelli court’s analysis is correct
and the most viable. However, the court did not
reach a holding as to whether strict scrutiny or
intermediate scrutiny should apply to laws affecting
nonimmigrants. The court found the determination
of the level of judicial scrutiny pointless, because
the licensing law under either standard would fail.108
Despite the Court’s decision to forgo such a holding,
its analysis strongly suggests that laws affecting
nonimmigrants should be subject to strict scrutiny.
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The Adusumelli court noted that the Supreme
Court in Nyquist applied strict scrutiny to a law affecting
foreign nationals who had not, and did not intend to
apply for permanent residency.109 Therefore, it logically
follows from Nyquist that strict scrutiny should apply
to licensing laws preventing nonimmigrants from
entering licensed professions. Furthermore, the Graham
Court’s reason for determining that classifications
based on alienage are subject to strict scrutiny was that
such a classification was inherently suspect, and that
immigrants are a “discrete and insular minority.”110
Classifications that affect nonimmigrants are no less
inherently suspect than classifications that affect LPRs,
and nonimmigrants are certainly a discrete and insular
minority.
Should the Supreme Court consider a case
regarding licensing of nonimmigrants, the Court
should clarify that its application of strict scrutiny
to classifications based on alienage covers all foreign
nationals, regardless of whether they are immigrants
or nonimmigrants.
VI. CONCLUSION
The state licensing process for professionals
should be open to U.S. citizens, immigrants, and
nonimmigrants alike. Federal immigration power
preempts states laws that prohibit nonimmigrants
from entering professions such as law, medicine
and engineering. Moreover, Congress has occupied
the field of immigrant admissions, and, thus, these
state licensing laws stand as an obstacle to federal
determination of admissibility. Furthermore, such
laws should be subject to strict scrutiny because there
is no significant distinction between immigrants and
nonimmigrants in an equal protection analysis.
Nonimmigrants who face the barriers such as
ones faced by the plaintiffs in LeClerc, who are merely
coming to the U.S. to better their lives by entering
licensed professions, have a tough and precarious
predicament, and deserve relief. The denial of an
opportunity to enter their professions not only hurts
the individuals, but U.S. employers, and citizens
who would benefit from their work. Congress and
state legislatures should eliminate prohibitive state
licensure laws and regulations, such as the Louisiana
bar rule. And if necessary, the courts should act and
strike them down. If nonimmigrants can take the
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licensing exams required for their field in all states, an
impediment will disappear, uncertainty will dissipate,
and highly educated and qualified workers will be
encouraged to bring their skills to the U.S.
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THE EMERGING TREND OF EXTENDING ADA
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION BEYOND THE
WORKPLACE TO INCLUDE COMMUTING ISSUES:
A COMMENT ON COLWELL V. RITE AID
By Frederick J. Melkey1

I. Introduction
A. Colwell v. Rite Aid Breaks New Ground
The Americans with Disability Act2
(“ADA”) requires an employer to provide reasonable
accommodation to an employee or job applicant with
a disability, unless doing so would cause significant
difficulty or expense for the employer.3 The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
describes a reasonable accommodation as “any
change in the work environment (or in the way things are
usually done) to help a person with a disability apply
for a job, perform the duties of a job, or enjoy the
benefits and privileges of employment.”4 Historically,
employers have understood that the scope of a
“reasonable accommodation” is limited to the
workplace.5 As one court stated, “[w]hile an employer
is required to provide reasonable accommodations
that eliminate barriers in the work environment, an
employer is not required to eliminate those barriers
which exist outside the work environment.”6
Last year, the Third Circuit broke with
historical precedent in the case of Colwell v. Rite
Aid Corp.7 It stated that the ADA “does not strictly
limit the breadth of reasonable accommodations to
address only those problems that an employee has
in performing her work that arise once she arrives
at the workplace.”8 Colwell was in direct conflict with
a Third Circuit unpublished decision by a different
three judge panel.9 This result led to concern within
the employer community about judicial expansion of
the reasonable accommodation requirement under
the ADA.10 Fueling employer concerns is a new
unpublished decision in the Ninth Circuit, Livingston
v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc.11 which favorably cites Colwell,
and also finds that the employer needs to consider
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a reasonable accommodation for the non-workplace
commute.
Colwell has drawn limited commentary
from the academic community. Professor Sullivan
mentions in a blog posting that Colwell may implicate
the existing EEOC guidance that the ADA does
not require an employer to make accommodations
primarily for the employee’s personal benefit.12 As
he points out, “getting to work is not exactly for
personal benefit, but both cases [Colwell and a 1995
case which it cites] illustrate the occasional difficulty
of drawing the work/personal line. Certainly, many
employers view their workers’ commutation as their
own responsibility.”13
This paper recommends that although much
of the case law14 has not interpreted the reasonable
accommodation provision of the ADA as broadly as
Colwell, the holding and reasoning should be adopted
by other circuits. Both legislative history and public
policy reasons militate in favor of this approach. Much
like the courts chipped away at the ADA’s definition
of a “person with a disability,” narrowing it to the
point it required Congress to enact amendments in
2008 to overturn Supreme Court precedent,15 the
courts have been similarly limiting the interpretation
of “reasonable accommodation.” I promote a return
to requiring employers and employees to engage in
the interactive process envisioned by the ADA in
circumstances similar to those in Colwell. A broader
reading of the ADA’s reasonable accommodation
requirements would not be judicial expansion, but a
return to both the original meaning of the Act and the
intent of Congress when it enacted the ADA twenty
years ago. To that end, Colwell is not really breaking
new ground; it is replacing the divot16 made by courts as
they have taken repeated swings at the statute.
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B. A Summary of the Original and Continuing need
for the ADA
People with disabilities have endured an
inferior economic position in American society.17
Before passage of the ADA in 1990
[T]wo out of every three disabled
Americans of working-age were not
employed, and two of three who
were not working wanted to be, the
income of disabled workers was
about thirty six percent less than
that of their nondisabled counterparts, and in 1984 fifty percent of
adults with disabilities had household incomes of $15,000 or less,
compared to only twenty-five percent of non-disabled adults.18
Many of these trends continue to this day.
In November of 2010, more than two out of three
working-age people with disabilities were still not
employed; those without disabilities were employed at
roughly twice that rate.19 As the Department of Labor
recently articulated in a news release seeking public
input on ways to strengthen disability regulations
…the rate of disabled people who
are unemployed or not in the labor
force remain[s] significantly higher
than those without disabilities.
According to recent data from the
U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 21.7 percent of
people with disabilities were in the
labor force in June 2010, compared
with 70.5 percent of people with
no disability. In addition, the unemployment rate for those with disabilities was 14.4 percent, compared
with 9.4 percent unemployment for
those without a disability.
“Work is central to every person’s
financial independence, sense of
self and integrity,” said OFCCP
Director Patricia A. Shiu.20
This poor experience of the disabled in the
workplace can not be explained solely by the types of
prejudice encountered by racial and ethnic minorities,
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women, and the elderly.21 Many disabilities prevent
effective performance in a broad variety of jobs.22
Moreover, employers may find it efficient to refuse
to hire anyone with particular disabilities regardless
of their ability to do the job because employers have
structured their work processes and physical facilities
for the average non-disabled worker.23 “The lowering
of this type of barrier to the equal participation
of individuals in the workforce requires regulation
beyond the mere condemnation of unequal treatment
on the basis of disability as a suspect, protected
class.”24 Instead, it requires the employers make
accommodations for the disabled in the workplace.
How far the employer must go to make reasonable
accommodations is a policy choice with many facets.25
II. The History of Workplace Disability
Legislation
A. The Precursor to the ADA: The Rehabilitation
Act of 1973
In its first significant treatment of how far
employers must go to provide accommodation for
disabled employees, Congress stopped short of
imposing obligations on private employers that could
not pass the costs along to the federal government.26
The Rehabilitation Act of 197327 made the policy
choice that those accommodation costs be assessed
upon federal sector employers, federal contractors,
and other employers receiving federal financial
assistance.28
“The 1973 Act, in addition to increasing
funding for vocational rehabilitation, sought to
eradicate discriminatory and other barriers to the hiring
of disabled workers.”29 Part of the purpose stated in
the statute is “to ensure that the Federal Government
plays a leadership role in promoting the employment
of individuals with disabilities, especially individuals
with significant disabilities, and in assisting States and
providers of services in fulfilling the aspirations of
such individuals with disabilities for meaningful and
gainful employment and independent living.”30
“Section 501 imposes affirmative action
obligations on federal agencies. Section 502 seeks to
remove physical barriers in federal buildings. Section
503 levies affirmative action duties on all federal
contractors with contracts in excess of $10,000. These
duties extend to all of the contractors’ operations.”31
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Section 504 prohibits federal programs and any
program or activity receiving federal funding assistance
from discriminating against “otherwise qualified
individual[s] with a disability . . . solely by reason of
her or his disability.”32 Thus, the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 goes beyond the neutral treatment of people
with disabilities to require something more to ensure
opportunities in employment.
B. ADA: The American’s with Disabilities Act of 1990
“Congress rarely writes on a clean slate,
and the ADA is no exception to this rule. Congress
drew heavily on section 504 and its regulations when
enacting the ADA.”33 Seventeen years after enacting
the Rehabilitation Act, Congress took the next step
of imposing similar obligations on all but the smallest
private employers by enacting the Americans with
Disabilities Act.34 Supreme Court Justice Stevens
noted
The ADA was passed by large
majorities in both Houses of Congress after decades of deliberation
and investigation into the need
for comprehensive legislation to
address discrimination against persons with disabilities. In the years
immediately preceding the ADA’s
enactment, Congress held 13 hearings and created a special task force
that gathered evidence from every
State in the Union. The conclusions
Congress drew from this evidence
are set forth in the task force and
Committee Reports, described in
lengthy legislative hearings, and
summarized in the preamble to
the statute. Central among these
conclusions was Congress’ finding
that “individuals with disabilities
are a discrete and insular minority
who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to
a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in
our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of
such individuals and resulting from
24

stereotypic assumptions not truly
indicative of the individual ability
of such individuals to participate in,
and contribute to, society.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(7).
Invoking “the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment
and to regulate commerce,” the
ADA is designed “to provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” §§ 12101(b)(1), (b)(4). It
forbids discrimination against persons with disabilities in three major
areas of public life: employment,
which is covered by Title I of the
statute; public services, programs,
and activities, which are the subject
of Title II; and public accommodations, which are covered by Title
III.35
Also key within the employment context is
that the ADA defines a “qualified individual with a
disability” to mean “an individual with a disability
who, with or without a reasonable accommodation can
perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires.”36 It
also expressly includes as a category of discrimination
“not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability who is an
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose
an undue hardship on the operation of the business
of such covered entity.”37 As such, the ADA “clearly
seems to require employers something more than
formally neutral treatment.”38
C. ADAAA: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008
The ADA Amendments Act of 200839
(ADAAA) is the most recent legislative response to
the issues people with disabilities face. The ADAAA
“represents a fairly dramatic change in disability
law.”40 As Professor Long observes, many of the
objectives of the ADA were never realized
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When the first President Bush signed
the original Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) into law in 1990, he
said it was time “to rejoice in and
celebrate another ‘Independence
Day,’ one that is long overdue.” For
the 43 million Americans with disabilities, the ADA was supposed to
represent the opening of doors that
had long been closed. Employers,
state and local governments, and
private businesses—from bowling
alleys to restaurants—would now be
required to make reasonable modifications to their facilities, policies,
and procedures in order to allow full
participation by individuals with disabilities. In short, expectations for
the ADA were high.
This probably explains why the
ADA is viewed so widely by disability rights advocates and its original
authors as such a huge disappointment, especially in the employment
context. Studies consistently reveal
that, despite the ADA, employees
who claim to be the victims of disability discrimination in the workplace face long odds. . . .
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 sets
out to address some of the more controversial and
problematic aspects of the definition of disability 41
The ADAAA is a legislative response to
years of judicial narrowing of that definition as it
specifically abrogates several Supreme Court rulings.42
The statute indicates that the purpose is to “carry
out the ADA’s objectives of providing ‘a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination’ and ‘clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination’
by reinstating a broad scope of protection to be
available under the ADA”43 This expanded definition
of disability means that more people will be able to
pass the initial coverage threshold, and be able to
enter the interactive process in which an employer
must consider reasonable accommodations.44
One issue that has recently divided the
circuit courts is whether an employer must provide
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a reasonable accommodation to an individual that it
merely “regards as” having a disability.45 “The Act
provides that employers and other covered entities
‘need not provide a reasonable accommodation or
a reasonable modification to policies, practices, or
procedures to an individual who meets’ the ‘regarded
as’ definition. Thus, the new amendments effectively
end the ongoing dispute among the courts on this
issue.” 46 Congress did not address other aspects of
reasonable accommodations.
III. Defining a “Reasonable” Accommodation
A. Statutory Overview
Since Colwell is in the employment context,
this paper focuses on the meaning of a Reasonable
Accommodation within Title I of the ADA.47
“One of the most elusive concepts in the ADA is
that of ‘reasonable accommodation’ in the context
of employment.”48 There are several sections and
definitions of terms that must be read together to
establish the standard for providing a reasonable
accommodation.
To avoid discriminating against a qualified
person with a disability, the text of the statute requires
that the employer “mak[e] reasonable accommodations
to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is
an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity
can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business of such covered entity.”49 The definitions
section provides some clues to the meaning of this
passage. First, it defines a “qualified individual”
as “an individual who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of
the employment position that such individual holds
or desires.”50 However, the very next sentence of
the statute provides a surprise. “The ADA does not
define ‘reasonable accommodation.’ Instead, it lists
examples of what the term may include.”51
The term “reasonable accommodation” may include—
(A) making existing facilities used by
employees readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities; and
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(B) job restructuring, part-time
or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment
or devices, appropriate adjustment
or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies,
the provision of qualified readers
or interpreters, and other similar
accommodations for individuals
with disabilities.52

The term “undue hardship” means
an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered
in light of the factors set forth in
subparagraph (B).

While the accommodations in sub-paragraph
A require physical changes to the workplace, those
in sub-paragraph B are mandatory departures from
neutral employer practices.53 As Professor Weber
observes

(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter;

In the text of the ADA, Congress buttressed its requirement
that employers depart from otherwise neutral rules by prohibiting
standards, criteria, or methods of
administration that have the effect
of discriminating on the basis of
disability, as well as by outlawing
qualification standards, employment
tests, or other selection criteria that
tend to screen out persons with disabilities unless the standard, test, or
other criterion is shown to be jobrelated and consistent with business
necessity. So not only may a variance
or departure from an otherwise neutral rule or practice be required as a
matter of reasonable accommodation, but also the neutral rule itself
may be illegal when applied to an
applicant or employee with a disability if it has a discriminatory effect or
unjustified negative impact.54
Another key part of understanding the duty to
provide a reasonable accommodation is the limitation
is that it must fall below the threshold of an undue
hardship. “Unlike reasonable accommodation, ‘undue
hardship’ receives a statutory definition.”55 It includes
not only a definition, but also a detailed list of factors
to consider when making the determination.
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(B) Factors to be considered
In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on a covered entity, factors
to be considered include—

(ii) the overall financial resources
of the facility or facilities involved
in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such
facility; the effect on expenses and
resources, or the impact otherwise
of such accommodation upon the
operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources
of the covered entity; the overall
size of the business of a covered
entity with respect to the number of
its employees; the number, type, and
location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and
functions of the workforce of such
entity; the geographic separateness,
administrative, or fiscal relationship
of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.56
Reading these portions of the statute together,
“[t]he text and structure of the statute suggest a
substantial obligation to provide accommodation
up to the limit of hardship demonstrated by the
employer.”57
B. EEOC Interpretation
Under the familiar Chevron doctrine, courts
must grant deference to the EEOC’s interpretation
of the ADA where it is reasonable.58 “With regard to
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reasonable accommodation and undue hardship, the
EEOC regulations for Title I of the ADA repeat the
prohibition in the statute, stating that it is unlawful
for covered entities to fail to make reasonable
accommodations unless they can demonstrate that
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on the business operations of the employer.”59
Without providing a more detailed definition or
factors to consider, “[l]ike the statute, the regulations
rely more on example or typology than definition
when discussing reasonable accommodation.”60 The
EEOC regulations state that
[t]he term reasonable accommodations means: (i) [m]odifications or
adjustments to a job application
process that enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such qualified
applicant desires; or (ii) [m]odifications or adjustments to the work
environment, or the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily
performed, that enable a qualified
individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that
position; or (iii) [m]odifications or
adjustments that enable a covered
entity’s employee with a disability to
enjoy equal benefits and privileges
of employment as are enjoyed by its
other similarly situated employees
without disabilities.
The regulations save their definitional language for undue hardship,
and essentially track the statute
when they provide the definition.
The regulations specifically list difficulties imposed on co-workers,
not as part of what may make an
accommodation unreasonable, but
as part of what may make hardship
undue for the employer.61
The EEOC Interpretative Guidance does
go a bit deeper and provides additional examples and
categories of possible accommodations.
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There are a number of possible
reasonable accommodations that
an employer may have to provide
in connection with modifications
to the work environment or adjustments in how and when a job is performed. These include:
• making existing facilities accessible;
• job restructuring;
• part-time or modified work schedules;
• acquiring or modifying equipment;
• changing tests, training materials,
or policies;
• providing qualified readers or
interpreters; and
• reassignment to a vacant position.62
The Interpretive Guidance goes further in
describing the requirements related to modifying
work schedules as a reasonable accommodation in
question and answer format with three examples of
how it applies.
Must an employer allow an employee
with a disability to work a modified
or part-time schedule as a reasonable accommodation, absent undue
hardship?
Yes. A modified schedule may
involve adjusting arrival or departure
times, providing periodic breaks,
altering when certain functions are
performed, allowing an employee
to use accrued paid leave, or providing additional unpaid leave. An
employer must provide a modified
or part-time schedule when required
as a reasonable accommodation,
absent undue hardship, even if it
does not provide such schedules for
other employees.
Example A: An employee with HIV
infection must take medication
on a strict schedule. The medica-
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tion causes extreme nausea about
one hour after ingestion, and generally lasts about 45 minutes. The
employee asks that he be allowed to
take a daily 45-minute break when
the nausea occurs. The employer
must grant this request absent
undue hardship.

of her position, operating the printing presses, requires that she work
at night because the newspaper cannot be printed during the daytime
hours. Since the employer cannot
modify her hours, it must consider
whether it can reassign her to a different position.63

For certain positions, the time during which an essential function is
performed may be critical. This
could affect whether an employer
can grant a request to modify an
employee’s schedule. Employers
should carefully assess whether
modifying the hours could significantly disrupt their operations —
that is, cause undue hardship — or
whether the essential functions may
be performed at different times with
little or no impact on the operations
or the ability of other employees to
perform their jobs.

“The Supreme Court views EEOC
interpretations of this type as less than controlling
authority but notes that they ‘constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance.’”64
However, they do establish the guideposts for how
the administrative agency responsible for enforcing
the ADA views an employer’s responsibility in making
adjustments to work schedules, and the types of cases
the EEOC might choose to pursue.

If modifying an employee’s schedule poses an undue hardship, an
employer must consider reassignment to a vacant position that would
enable the employee to work during
the hours requested.
Example B: A day care worker
requests that she be allowed to
change her hours from 7:00 a.m.–
3:00 p.m. to 10:00 a.m.–6:00 p.m.
because of her disability. The day
care center is open from 7:00 a.m.–
7:00 p.m. and it will still have sufficient coverage at the beginning of
the morning if it grants the change
in hours. In this situation, the
employer must provide the reasonable accommodation.
Example C: An employee works
for a morning newspaper, operating the printing presses which run
between 10 p.m. and 3 a.m. Due to
her disability, she needs to work in
the daytime. The essential function
28

C. The Supreme Court Standard from U.S. Airways,
Inc v. Barnett
Although many aspects of ADA have come
before the Supreme Court,65 only one case addresses
the reasonable accommodation requirement of the
act, U.S. Airways, Inc v. Barnett.66 “Robert Barnett
injured his back while working as a cargo handler for
U.S. Airways and transferred to a mailroom position
that was less physically demanding. Two years later,
Barnett’s position became open for seniority-based
employee bidding, and Barnett learned that employees
senior to him planned to bid for it.”67 At this point,
he became “[c]oncerned that he would be forced to
transfer back to his cargo position.”68 “Barnett asked
U.S. Airways to accommodate his disability under the
ADA by granting him an exemption from seniority
rules so that he could remain in the mailroom.
U.S. Airways denied Barnett’s request, and shortly
thereafter Barnett lost his job.”69
The Ninth Circuit initially affirmed
the district court’s grant of summary judgment for U.S. Airways,
but upon rehearing en banc, the
full panel reversed and remanded.
Rejecting the notion that a seniority system always trumps reasonable
accommodation considerations, the
panel held that the presence of a
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seniority system is merely “a factor
in the undue hardship analysis.” The
panel demanded that courts undertake a “case-by-case fact intensive analysis” to ascertain whether
the requested reassignment would
impose an undue hardship on the
employer. Reviewing the record,
the court concluded that a trial was
needed to resolve the factual dispute
in Barnett’s case. 70
The Supreme Court decided in a 5-4 decision
to vacate the Ninth Circuits en banc ruling and
remanded.71
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer
rejected both parties’ “radically different” views and adopted a compromise position. He began his analysis
by criticizing U.S. Airways’ interpretation of the ADA as requiring only
“equal” (as opposed to preferential) treatment of disabled workers.
On the contrary, the ADA’s focus
on “accommodation” implies the
need for differential treatment, and
therefore “preferences will sometimes prove necessary to achieve the
Act’s basic equal opportunity goal.”
Bolstering this interpretation is the
fact that neither Congress nor the
lower courts have suggested that
neutral work policies—such as neutral furniture budget rules—justify
automatically exempting employers from ADA requirements. The
Court then launched an equally disapproving attack on Barnett’s interpretation of “reasonable accommodation” as “effective accommodation.” It is not enough, the Court
wrote, for an employee to prove
that her proposed accommodation
will effectively meet her disabilityrelated needs. The employee must
also demonstrate that the proposed
accommodation “seems reasonable on its face,” meaning that the
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accommodation would be reasonable “in the run of cases.”
Having concluded that the ADA
may mandate preferential treatment but requires proof of reasonableness, the Court then applied
its analysis to the particularities of
Barnett’s seniority system challenge.
Concurring with other courts, the
majority recognized the beneficial effects of seniority systems on
employee-management relations:
most notably, they cabin management discretion, thereby inducing
employee expectations of fair, standardized treatment. It follows that
employers and nondisabled employees would suffer greatly if courts
granted disabled employees automatic superseniority rights for reassignment purposes under the ADA.
Therefore, the Court held, it would
not “ordinarily” be reasonable for
an ADA job reassignment to trump
seniority rules, and an employer’s
showing that an assignment would
violate the rules of a seniority system would warrant summary judgment for the employer “in the run
of cases.”
But in keeping with its compromise analysis, the Court also held
that an employee could avoid summary judgment by demonstrating
that “special circumstances” exist.
Such special circumstances might
include evidence that the seniority
system already contains so many
exceptions, or is altered unilaterally by the employer so frequently,
that allowing an exception for disabled employees would not significantly alter employee expectations.
Because Barnett had not yet had the
opportunity to make such a showing, the Court remanded the case
for further proceedings.72
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The close 5-4 decision drew a concurrence
and two dissents.73 Justice Souter’s dissent sided with
Barnett, and argued in favor of the Ninth Circuit’s
case-by-case, fact-intensive approach, under which
a seniority system would be merely one factor in
a court’s analysis of undue hardship limitation.74
His dissent notes nothing in the ADA insulates
seniority rules from the reasonable accommodation
requirement which is in marked contrast to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)
and Title VII.75 Admitting that statutory silence is
ambiguous, Justice Souter cited legislative history
that used the “factor” formula as evidence to support
his position that seniority rules do not automatically
trump reassignment rights.76
However, the ADA is distinct from other
civil rights statutes due to its emphasis on “reasonable
accommodation.”77
Because Barnett was the Court’s
first stab at interpreting this core
term, one might have expected
the opinion to address the special
implications of the phrase and the
additional responsibilities and costs
employers must assume to respond
adequately to the distinct problem
of disability discrimination. Instead,
the Court treated the ADA as more
of the same—as if in drafting the
ADA, Congress merely intended to
add disability to the long list of classifications already protected by Title
VII and the ADEA, and to restate
the Rehabilitation Act with only
slight modification. Accordingly,
the Court simply imported case law
from other areas of civil rights law
and cited it as persuasive authority
without fully justifying its application to an ADA claim. . . .
To be sure, reasoning by analogy
often drives our legal system forward and is frequently an indispensable tool for statutory interpretation
of recently passed legislation. But a
critical component of reasoning by
analogy is an explanation of why it
is appropriate to treat the issue at
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bar in accordance with the alreadydecided issue. That the Barnett
majority neglected to include this
component leaves it open to the
charge that it imply overlooked—
instead of considering and rejecting— differences between the ADA
and other antidiscrimination statutes.
The analogies to other civil rights
statutes are especially strained in
light of the evidence that Congress intended the ADA to perform
somewhat differently. As Justice
Souter noted in his Barnett dissent,
Title VII and the ADEA explicitly
insulate seniority rules from the
reasonable accommodation requirement; in marked contrast, the ADA
does not. While the ADA’s silence
certainly does not, on its own,
mandate less deference to seniority
systems under the ADA, legislative
history suggests the possibility. The
House and Senate Reports for the
ADA explicitly limit an employer’s
ability to use collective bargaining agreements to avoid compliance with the ADA. Moreover, the
Senate Report explains that courts
should consider a collective bargaining agreement that reserves certain
jobs for senior employees as only
“a factor” in the decision whether
to require the requested accommodation, and the House Report
clarifies that “the agreement would
not be determinative on the issue.”
Barnett’s presumption that seniority
rights trump the ADA’s reasonable
accommodation provision seems to
ignore these statements.78
“The Barnett Court’s holding is a relatively
narrow one: an employer generally need not
reassign a disabled employee as a reasonable
accommodation if doing so would conflict with the
terms of an employer’s seniority policy, unless special
circumstances justify a different result.”79 As such, it
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does not provide any clear black-letter law on which
to analyze the facts of Colwell v. Rite Aid. As Professor
Befort concludes
The fundamental shortcoming of
the Barnett decision . . . is in the
Court’s failure to provide adequate
guidance for future controversies. The Court is imprecise with
respect to the type of “special circumstances” that will overcome the
presumption of unreasonableness
in requiring a reassignment in the
face of a conflicting seniority system. The Court does not explain
how its ruling will impact the balance of reassignment and other
types of transfer and assignment
policies. The Court fails to articulate
a clear allocation of the burden of
proof responsibilities with respect
to establishing a reasonable accommodation. And, finally, the Court
falls short of demarcating when, if
ever, an accommodation should be
deemed unreasonable by virtue of
the fact that it requires the provision
of preferential treatment for the disabled.
....
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Barnett provides an appropriate touchstone for the unanswered
questions relating to the reassignment accommodation. According to
[her], reassignment is unreasonable
if someone other than the disabled
employee seeking a transfer has a
legally enforceable entitlement to
the position in question. This standard provides a predictable basis
for determining Barnett’s special
circumstances exception to the presumption favoring seniority systems.
More broadly, this standard calls for
an undue hardship-based test for
determining whether reassignment
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should prevail over other types of
transfer and assignment policies.80
D. The Facts of Colwell v. Rite Aid
Jeanette Colwell worked as a part-time
cashier at a Rite-Aid pharmacy81. She would primarily
work weekday shifts from 5 p.m. to 9 p.m.82 Her
personal preferences were listed as 9 a.m. to 2 p.m. or
5 p.m. to 9 p.m.83 During her employment, she was
recognized by her superiors for good performance.84
She subsequently developed a vision impairment
that caused her to lose sight in her left eye; but this
did not affect her ability to fully perform all of the
essential functions of her job.85 Colwell informed her
supervisor that her impairment made it dangerous
and difficult for her to drive at night and requested
that she be assigned only to the day shifts.86 Her
supervisor denied her request, stating that allowing
her to work only day shifts “wouldn’t be fair” to other
employees.87 In the meantime, Colwell had family
members drive her to and from work. Although
she did not miss any work, Colwell claimed this
arrangement posed a hardship to her family, and
renewed her request for a day shift only schedule.88
Rite-Aid continued to schedule her for a mixture of
day and night shifts.89 After unsuccessfully engaging
her union representative in the dialogue, Colwell
ultimately submitted her resignation complaining of
unfair treatment.90
The District Court granted summary
judgment for Rite Aid on the ADA claim, concluding
that while Colwell was an individual with a disability,
she did not suffer any adverse employment action
cognizable under the ADA.91 Specifically, the
District Court found that because Colwell did not
need any reasonable accommodation in order to
perform the essential functions of her job, Rite
Aid had no obligation to consider her shift transfer
request and “had no duty to accommodate her
commute to work.”92 It viewed such a request as
“tantamount to making an employer responsible for
how an employee gets to work, a situation which
expands the employer’s responsibility beyond the
ADA’s intention.”93 On Colwell’s appeal, the Third
Circuit reversed. It held that “as a matter of law that
changing her working schedule to day shifts in order
to alleviate her disability-related difficulties in getting
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to work is a type of accommodation that the ADA
contemplates.”94
E. A Review of other ADA Commuting
cases preceding Colwell
The year before Colwell, a different three
judge panel in the Third Circuit ruled in the
unpublished commuting related ADA case of Parker
v. Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc.95 In this case, Verizon had
conformed to a number of components of Parker’s
accommodation request, but denied a transfer to a
location that would have shorted his commute as
suggested by his physician.96 The Third Circuit stated
that “Verizon’s failure to accommodate Parker by
limiting his commute was not required.”97 With no
Third Circuit precedent on point, the Court cited
two cases from other circuits it found persuasive.98
The first was Kvorjak v. Maine, holding that “the
[employer’s] decision to reject an accommodation
based on [the employee’s] commute does not
demonstrate a disregard for its obligations under the
ADA.”99 The facts and holding are distinguishable
from both Parker and Colwell in that the basis for the
courts decision was actually predicated on Kvorjak’s
inability to perform the essential functions of his job
at home, not that the accommodation requested was
unreasonable because it rose to the level of undue
hardship.100 The second case was LaResca v. American
Telephone & Telegraph, holding that “commuting to and
from work is not part of the work environment that an
employer is required to reasonably accommodate.”101
LaResca suffered from bouts of epilepsy and
therefore could not drive himself to work. Although
he could nonetheless perform all essential functions
of the job, he was denied this accommodation under
the New Jersey State Law Against Discrimination,
not the ADA.102
Another example from a different circuit
decision where the commute to work was excluded
from the potential reasonable accommodations was
in Florida. There, a school guidance counselor was
denied a transfer to a closer school to reduce her
commute in the case of Salmon v. Dade County School
Board.103 The Court reasoned that “the commute to
and from work is an activity that is unrelated to and
outside of her job. While an employer is required to
provide reasonable accommodations that eliminate
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barriers in the work environment, an employer is not
required to eliminate those barriers which exist outside
the work environment.”104
Before Colwell, the only recorded case
going against precedent was the Second Circuit
case Lyons v. Legal Aid Society, which held that
employers must consider an accommodation related
to the commute.105 Lyons was an attorney who was
injured in a near fatal automobile accident, and
her resulting condition severely limited her ability
to walk long distances.106 Because her condition
precludes her from taking public transportation,
she asked her employer to pay for parking near her
office and the courts in which she would practice.107
The court reversed the summary judgment for the
employer, holding that there is nothing “inherently
unreasonable . . . in requiring an employer to furnish
an otherwise qualified employee with assistance in
getting to work,” and remanded the case back to the
trial court to establish a factual record as to whether
this requested accommodation rose to the level of
undue hardship for the employer.108
The Third Circuit in Colwell found the
infrequently cited fifteen year old Second Circuit
Lyons reasoning to be persuasive, stating
At least one other court of appeals
has recognized this principle. In
Lyons v. Legal Aid Society an employee
who suffered severe physical impairments due to a car accident that prevented her from walking long distances sued her employer, Legal Aid,
under the ADA in part for refusing
to provide her financial assistance
to pay for a parking space close to
work. The Second Circuit held that
the employee stated an ADA claim
because, depending on the circumstances, such an accommodation
might be reasonable. Although we
voice no comment on that court’s
holding that a reasonable accommodation could include funds to
pay for an employee’s parking space,
we agree with the court’s observation that “there is nothing inherently unreasonable, given the stated
views of Congress and the agencies
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responsible for overseeing the federal disability statutes, in requiring
an employer to furnish an otherwise
qualified disabled employee with
assistance related to her ability to
get to work.”109

F. The Ninth Circuit follows Colwell
In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit
recently followed Colwell in Livingston v. Fred Meyers
Stores, Inc.110 Similar to Jeanette Colwell, Michelle
Livingston suffers from a vision impairment that
affects her ability to safely drive and walk outside
after dark.111
In the fall of 2005, Livingston’s
supervisor granted Livingston’s
request to work a modified schedule
during the fall and winter months
so that she could minimize driving after dark. In the fall of 2006,
however, Fred Meyer Stores denied
Livingston’s request for a modified
schedule, even though the store had
not experienced any hardship the
previous year when Livingston was
permitted to work under a modified
schedule. In fact, Livingston was
credited with increasing wine sales
and improving the store’s ranking
when she worked under the modified schedule.” When Livingston
refused to work her scheduled shift,
Fred Meyer fired her.112
The Court reversed the district court order
granting summary judgment in favor of the employer
and held that that Livingston had “raised a triable
issue of material fact that Fred Meyer Stores failed to
reasonably accommodate her and failed to engage in
the interactive process in good faith.”113
IV. Other Circuits Should Adopt the
Holding and Reasoning of Colwell
A. The Legislative History of the ADA Compels
Adoption
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Colwell utilizes legislative history to reach the
conclusion that an accommodation for a disability
can extend to the workplace commute. It notes
Congress acknowledged that “modified work schedules can provide
useful accommodations” and noted
that “persons who may require
modified work schedules are persons with mobility impairments
who depend on a public transportation system that is not currently
fully accessible.” …Thus, the ADA
does not strictly limit the breadth
of reasonable accommodations to
address only those problems that
an employee has in performing her
work that arise once she arrives at
the workplace.114
When introducing the ADA, cosponsor
Senator D’Amato specifically noted the daily struggles
that people with disabilities face in getting to and from
work.115 “The barriers the disabled must overcome
in order to meet basic needs are many. Activities
accomplished with ease by most— communicating,
commuting, or entering the workplace—are often
significant hurdles for those with disabilities. This
legisiation (sic), Mr. President, will break down these
barriers once and for all.”116 Congress also considered
that improvements to public transportation would
help people with disabilities commute to work.117
Also, it knew that handicapped parking spaces118
and architectural improvements to the workplace
such as ramps119 would make it possible for people
with disabilities to get into the workplace. Clearly, by
enacting the ADA, Congress was concerned not only
with accommodating workers once they somehow
miraculously arrived inside the workplace, but they
were also cognizant they needed to help people with
disabilities to arrive at exterior of and to enter the
workplace. Commuting to work is an important
prerequisite to reducing the unemployment rate for
people with disabilities, one of the key aims for the
ADA.120
B. Adopting Colwell is Consistent with Current
Workplace Employment Trends and is Sound
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Public Policy
It is well established that “[i]ssues related to
getting to work keep many potential employees with
disabilities from working to their fullest potential,”121
and that the ADA was intended to be construed
broadly.122 Since the employment objectives of the
ADA were never achieved,123 construing the statute
to cover situations such as those that arose in Colwell
can help eliminate a key barrier to accomplishing
those goals.
Outside of the realm of ADA
accommodations,
employers
have
been
accommodating the needs of their employees with
more workplace flexibility. For example, a recent
study found that
[t]here are two changes in the provision of flexibility between 2008 and
1998: 79 percent of employers now
allow at least some employees to
periodically change their arrival and
departure time, up from 68 percent.
In addition, 47 percent of employers allow at least some employees
to move from full-time to part-time
work and back again while remaining in the same position or level,
down from 57 percent.124
Considering work hour flexibility as
a reasonable accommodation for people with
disabilities would not be an unusual accommodation
since it is offered to a large proportion of employees
including those without disabilities. Public policy
would be served by a broad adoption of Colwell.
C. Employers Retain the Undue Hardship Defense
Holding that as a matter of law that
issues related to the workplace commute must be
considered within the realm of possible reasonable
accommodations does not mean that the employer
must automatically accommodate requests such as
those made by Jeanette Colwell; employers still retain
the undue hardship defense.125 “An accommodation is
not reasonable if it would impose an ‘undue hardship’
on the employer’s business.”126 As described in Section
II.B supra, this term ‘undue hardship” is defined in
the statute. “The cost for an employer must be more
than de minimus before the undue hardship test will
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be satisfied. . . . Each case must be decided on an
individual basis.”127
In addition to cost, employer concerns in
providing accommodations also include a threat to
employee morale if some workers are provided with
more flexibility in some workplace rules.
With respect to the impact on other
employees, the undue hardship test
will not be satisfied if the disruption
to them results from fears or prejudices towards the individual’s disability and not from the provision
of the accommodation. Nor is there
an undue hardship if the accommodation negatively impacts on the
morale of the other employees but
does not affect those employees’
ability to perform their jobs.128
The courts have already addressed the issue
of when changes to work schedules such as changing
shifts for non-commute related commutes rise to
the level of undue hardship,129 so determining when
this category of request reaches the level of undue
hardship could be easily integrated with existing
law and employer practices. Also, this reasonable
accommodation-undue hardship determination
requires close attention to the specific facts related to
workplace characteristics for both the employer and
the employee.130 For example, more will be expected
of larger employers, and less of smaller employers.131
Because of the fact specific nature of the inquiry,
juries should be the ones making the determination
of what constitutes undue hardship instead of judges
making a determination about reasonableness as a
matter of law.132
D. Engaging in the Interactive Process on Work
Schedules Makes Good Business Sense
Employers have been providing flexible work
schedules to their entire employee population on an
increasingly frequent basis.133 The benefits of these
flexible work schedules benefit both the employee
and the employer. One example is the Results-Only
Work Environment (ROWE) program implemented
at electronics retailer Best Buy. “The premise of
ROWE is that employees can do ‘whatever
they want whenever they want as long as the work
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gets done.’”134 Although the program was in response
to employee feedback, it also provided benefits to the
employer.135 “ROWE teams at Best Buy report an
average 3.2 percent lower voluntary turnover rates
than non-ROWE teams and employees report that
ROWE has changed their personal and work lives
for the better. ROWE teams are also experiencing an
average 35% increase in productivity.”136 Other studies
have also demonstrated the link between workplace
flexibility, increased employee engagement, and
reduced turnover.137 Another example is that research
suggests that providing employees more flexibility
over their working patterns is likely to improve their
health.138 The improved outcomes were in the areas
of “systolic blood pressure and heart rate, tiredness,
mental health, sleep duration, sleep quality and
alertness and self-rated health status,”139 and was
“also noted in well-being, such as co-workers’ social
support and sense of community.”140
Since technology and workplace expectations
change, employers should not rely on either past
precedent or how they decided internally in a similar
situation in the past. They should engage in the
interactive process with each request for flexibility.
Under the ADA, it is “clear that the [undue-hardship]
burden should be viewed as dynamic, one that
will change over time depending on what courts
and juries consider appropriate as technology and
social expectations change. If the social context
of the statute has any significance at all, it is that
accommodations that seemed beyond the pale
yesterday will be considered ordinary tomorrow.”141
V. Conclusion
In the introduction, this author admits
to using hyperbole in choosing to say that Colwell
“breaks new ground.” Although it is a break from the
case law, the subsequent golf analogy of “replacing a
divot” is also introduced to characterize the change
as a shift back to the original meaning and intent of
the ADA as passed by Congress and signed into law
by President Bush. Colwell and Livingston are simply
returns to an interpretation of the statute in harmony
with Congress’s broad goal under Title I of the ADA
in helping enable people with disabilities participate
in the job market.
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Judge Harold Leventhal is credited with saying
that citing legislative history is akin to “looking over
a crowd and picking out your friends.”142 However,
accommodating needs related to the workplace
commute are not circumstances in which there are
conflicting messages in the legislative history. There
is no evidence that Congress intended to preclude
the commute to the workplace from consideration
as a possible reasonable accommodation; legislative
history and the text of the statute both provide
evidence to the contrary. Judge Slovitier was right
when he wrote in Colwell that “changing Colwell’s
working hour schedule . . . is a type of accommodation
the ADA contemplates. The statute expressly says
so.”143
The ADAAA of 2008 reduced the threshold
for coverage under the act back to Congress’s original
intent two decades earlier.144 With increased coverage,
I anticipate that there will be more opportunity for
employers, and ultimately the courts to decide whether
flexibility related to the workplace commute can be
accommodated without creating undue hardship on
the employer.145 Employers should engage in the
interactive process with employees or applicants with
disabilities that have difficulty with commuting for
two reasons. It not only makes good business sense,
but is also what Congress commands.
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RACE AND IMMIGRATION LAW:
A TROUBLING MARRIAGE
By Lisa Sandoval1

“The differences of race added greatly to
the difficulties of the situation . . . . [T]hey remained
strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves,
and adhering to the customs and usages of their own
country. It seemed impossible for them to assimilate
with our people, or to make any change in their habits
or modes of living. As they grew in numbers each
year the people . . . saw . . . great danger that at no
distant day that portion of our country would be
overrun by them, unless prompt action was taken to
restrict their immigration.” – Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 18892
Introduction
Immigration from Mexico should be curtailed
because it threatens the United States by eroding
Anglo-Protestant culture. This thesis is advanced in
Who are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity3
by Samuel Huntington, one of the most widely
cited political scientists on international relations.4
Huntington warns that Hispanic immigration to
the United States threatens to transform the nation
into “a country of two languages, two cultures, and
two peoples.”5 The current immigration debate in
the United States shows that many people support
Huntington’s proposition, as evidenced in Arizona
Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070).6 Signed into law on
April 23, 2010, SB 1070 is aimed at identifying and
deporting “illegal immigrants.”7
In an attempt to facilitate this mission,
the law requires local law enforcement officials to
stop and demand identification from anyone they
“reasonably suspect” is in the country illegally.8
This of course begs the question, what gives rise to
“reasonable suspicion”? What does it mean to “look
illegal”? For that matter, what does it mean to look
42

“American”? The answers to these questions reveal
the troubling marriage between race and immigration
law. However, the underlying racism fueling SB
1070 does not represent a new trend. In fact, U.S.
immigration law uses racial difference as an indicator
of non-belonging and thus reifies notions of racial
inferiority.
Ian Haney Lopez, a prominent critical race
scholar, argues that the law not only reflects but
constructs social prejudice.9 The law thus becomes
an instrument in constructing and reinforcing
racial subordination.10 In this paper, I explore how
immigration law, in particular, constructs notions
of racial inferiority by associating racial difference
with noncitizen, or “illegal”, immigration status.
Within the immigration law framework, racially
different noncitizens are pitted against a seemingly
homogenous group of “American” citizens.
As Jennifer Gordon and R.A. Lenhardt point
out, citizenship has been used to refer to a whole
host of different ideas, including nationality, forms
of political participation, and entitlement to certain
rights.11 I use citizenship to refer to the entitlement to
belong. Within this definition of citizenship, belonging
encompasses both cultural and racial belonging in a
nation. I recognize that in practice citizenship does
not always grant automatic belonging in society.
Instead, I believe that citizenship is used by those
in power to determine who is worthy of belonging,
which history has revealed is a determination that
largely turns on race.
As Gordon and Lenhardt also discuss, by
defining inclusion, citizenship also defines exclusion.12
I argue that immigration law historically relied on
citizenship to exclude noncitizens, who have been
deemed unable to assimilate due to their race. In order
to gain legal status as a citizen—in order to belong—
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the noncitizen must assimilate to the citizen, who was
legally defined as white until 1952.13 Based on this
history, immigration law today continues to use racial
difference as an indicator of non-belonging, reifying
notions of racial inferiority in the process.
Kevin Johnson believes racism is visible in
immigration law because society transfers its racism
toward domestic minorities to noncitizens.14 While
overt racism toward minority citizens is much more
controversial, racism towards noncitizens can be
masked by facially neutral gripes about noncitizens’
failure to assimilate, frustration over linguistic
barriers, or intolerance of “criminals”15 who have
broken immigration laws. Johnson’s transference
theory helps explain why immigration laws continue
to justify a focus on racial difference to support race
neutral policies like protecting national security and
preserving American culture.16 The result of this kind
of immigration law and policy is what Mae M. Ngai
titles “alien citizenship.” As she explains, an “alien
citizen” is a U.S. Citizen “by virtue of her birth in the
United States but whose citizenship is suspect, if not
denied, on account of the racialized identity of her
immigrant ancestry.”17
I argue that SB 1070 provides a contemporary
example of the way immigration law constructs racial
difference as an indicator of non-belonging, reifying
notions of racial inferiority. Specifically, SB 1070
overtly attempts to exclude unwanted immigrants
and does so by mandating racial profiling. Arizona’s
new law illustrates Johnson’s theory of transference
as well as Ngai’s concept of “alien citizenship.” SB
1070 results from the evolution of this nation’s
immigration laws. Particularly important in shaping
SB 1070 is the plenary power doctrine, which currently
affords the political branches unfettered discretion
in regulating immigration. As a result of this broad
discretion, noncitizens are stripped of important
constitutional rights under federal immigration law.
SB 1070 employs a similar type of constitutional
rights-stripping.
Section One of this paper highlights four
moments in history that illustrate the way immigration
law constructs race. Section Two discusses which
constitutional protections are denied to noncitizens
in the immigration context. Section Three illustrates
how constitutional rights-stripping of noncitizens
leads to increases in racial profiling, both within and
outside of the immigration context. Section Four
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argues that SB 1070 is a product of this nation’s
historical racism towards immigrants. This section
frames SB 1070 within Johnson’s transference theory
and Ngai’s idea of alien citizenship. Finally, Section
Five provides recommendations for dismantling the
underlying racism present in immigration law.
Section One: A History of Racism in
Immigration Law
Perhaps more alarming than SB 1070’s express
sanction of racial profiling is the consistent theme
of racism present in the history of immigration law.
The evolution of U.S. immigration law demonstrates
the political and judicial branches’ repeated use of
race to deny different groups citizenship status. This
trend illustrates Gordon and Lenhardt’s theory that
citizenship defines exclusion, not merely inclusion.
While immigration law has changed over time, what
remains the same are notions of racial inferiority
associated with noncitizens. The history of U.S.
immigration law reveals many instances of race being
used to signify non-belonging, but I focus on four
moments: 1) Dred Scott v. Sandford,18 2) Chae Chan Ping
v. United States19 (the Chinese Exclusion Act case),
3) the “naturalization cases,” and 4) the Mexican
Repatriation and Operation Wetback.
Dred Scott Sets the Stage
Immigration to the United States is a
phenomenon that traces to the founding of the
nation.20 While immigration was largely unregulated
during roughly the first 100 years of the United
States’ existence, by 1882 the Chinese Exclusion Act
(“the Act”) was one of the first major attempts at
controlling the flow of people into the country.21 The
legal precedent established in Chae Chan Ping v. United
States,22 a case arising from the Act, created the legal
framework for immigration law in the United States.
However, it is important to understand how Dred
Scott v. Sandford, decided thirty-three years earlier, set
the stage for Chae Chan Ping by first characterizing
citizenship in terms of racial belonging and
assimilability.
In Dred Scott v. Sandford23 the United States
Supreme Court held that African Americans, even
those born free, were not U.S. Citizens.24 The Court
denied Dred Scott the ability to sue in federal
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court because it deemed that he was not a citizen
On May 8, 1882, Congress passed the
of the United States.25 The Supreme Court turned
Chinese Exclusion Act, which allowed the Executive
to race to determine whether the original framers
branch to exclude Chinese nationals from entering
intended to include slaves within the meaning of
the United States.30 Under the Act, Chinese nationals
already living in the United States needed to obtain
the Constitution.26 The Court presented exhaustive
evidence of racial animosity
a certificate of reentry if they
towards African Americans
left the country and wanted
in order to justify not granting
to return.31 Chae Chan Ping
whether the original framers intended
was a Chinese-born laborer
them citizenship status under
to include slaves within the meaning
living in California during the
the Constitution:
California Gold Rush, which
of the Constitution
We refer to these hislasted from approximately
torical facts for the
1848 to 1855.32 Before leaving
purpose of showing
the country to visit China, Ping obtained a certificate
the fixed opinions concerning that race,
of reentry, as required by the Act.33 However, during
upon which the statesmen of that
his absence from the country, Congress amended
day spoke and acted. It is necessary
the Act to ban reentry of Chinese, including those
to do this, in order to determine
who had obtained a certificate to do so.34 Ping was
whether the general terms used
barred from entering the country and challenged his
in the Constitution of the United
exclusion, which the Court upheld.35
States, as to the rights of man
Justice Field, writing for a unanimous court,
and the rights of the people, was
pointed
to
the Chinese laborers’ race as the underlying
intended to include them . . . .27
reason why they could not assimilate to U.S. culture:
While this case holds great meaning for many
The differences of race added
reasons beyond the scope of this paper, it is also
greatly to the difficulties of the situsignificant because the Court expressly characterized
ation. . . . [T]hey remained strangers
citizenship in terms of racial belonging. Thus, the
in the land, residing apart by themCourt focused on Scott’s racial difference as a reason
selves, and adhering to the customs
why he did not belong to the nation in the form of
and usages of their own country.
a citizen. Although this decision was later overturned
It seemed impossible for them to
by the Fourteenth Amendment,28 its characterization
assimilate with our people, or to
of noncitizens as racially different “others” set the
make any change in their habits or
jurisprudential stage for the Chinese Exclusions Act
modes of living.36
case.
The analysis then seamlessly transitioned
into the danger that the Chinese posed due to the
Chinese Exclusion and the Plenary Power Doctrine
increase in their population:
Chae Chan Ping set forth the plenary power
As they grew in numbers each year
doctrine, allowing the political branches unfettered
the people of the coast saw, or
power to regulate immigration. This discretionary
believed they saw, in the facility of
and far reaching power was justified in the name of
immigration, and in the crowded
“protecting” the nation from the danger posed by
millions of China, where population
racially different foreign nationals. The holdings of
presses upon the means of subsisthis case and the reasoning of the Court have set the
tence, great danger that at no disframework of immigration law enforcement until
tant day that portion of our country
present day. The Court’s reasoning focused on the
would be overrun by them, unless
Chinese’s racial difference as the reason why they
prompt action was taken to restrict
failed to assimilate and the threat they posed by that
their immigration. The people there
failure.29
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accordingly petitioned earnestly for
protective legislation.37

of the Naturalization Act of 1790 that extended
citizenship to “free white persons” and, after the
Fourteenth Amendment, “aliens of African nativity
It is clear that the Court based the racial
and . . . persons of African descent.”41 In these cases
difference of the Chinese on their inability to
courts determined whether a
assimilate, which posed a
particular group could meet the
“threat” to the people of the
prerequisite of being white in
The Court’s reasoning focused
United States. Justice Field
order to naturalize. The cases
on the Chinese’s racial difference
paints a picture of “others”
focused on race as an indicator
overtaking the nation.38 In the
as the reason why they failed to
of whether immigrants could
eyes of the Court, as well as
assimilate and the threat they
assimilate into U.S. culture,
those of Congress, the increased
which was another way of
posed by that failure.
presence of the Chinese—a
determining if they belonged
group viewed as so racially
and were thus worthy of
different that they could not blend in with their
citizenship status. The race-based requirement to
surrounding population—was something from which
naturalize was not lifted until 1952 with the passage
the people of the United States needed protection.
of the McCarran-Walter Act.42
It is through this framework of non-belonging and
It is worth noting that as a reaction to Dred
danger that the Court not only justifies, but promotes
Scott and Reconstruction efforts to rectify gross
the exclusion of the Chinese. This logic is further
inequalities, the Naturalization Act of 1790 was
evidenced when the Court declares:
amended to include “aliens of African nativity and
persons of African descent.”43 As a result of this
If…the government of the United
amendment, a black-white dichotomy of races within
States, through its legislative departthe naturalization system was created. The fact that all
ment, considers the presence of fornaturalization cases consisted of courts determining
eigners of a different race in this counwhether a particular group could be considered white
try, who will not assimilate with us, to
indicates that the black-white dichotomy was in fact
be dangerous to its peace and security,
a racial hierarchy in which whites were the dominate
their exclusion is not to be stayed
group to which noncitizens must conform. As such,
because at the time there are no
white was further constructed as the superior race to
actual hostilities with the nation of
39
which immigrants should assimilate if they were to
which the foreigners are subjects.
enjoy the full benefits of U.S. citizenship.
Chae Chan Ping built on the notion in Dred
For instance, In re Halladjian, Judge Lowell in
Scott of racial difference as creating a barrier to
the Massachusetts Circuit Court granted citizenship to
assimilation. The Court in both cases views an
four Armenians by relying on the popular usage of the
inability to assimilate due to racial difference as the
term “free white person.”44 The judge turned to late
ultimate marker of non-belonging. Going a step
eighteenth-century census documents that described
further, the Court in Chae Chan Ping characterizes
the inhabitants of the former colonies.45 Judge Lowell
the racial difference of noncitizens as a threat to
reasoned that since the censuses expressly mentioned
the nation, which justifies the political branches in
“Indians, Chinese, and Japanese,” the term white
taking whatever measures they deem appropriate in
was used as a “catch-all word to include everybody
regulating immigration.40 The result of this rationale
else.”46 While recognizing that “there is no European
is the plenary power doctrine, which ultimately leads
or white race,” Judge Lowell nonetheless allowed the
to constitutional rights-stripping of noncitizens.
notion of whiteness to continue as a prerequisite to
naturalizing. He granted the Armenians citizenship
The Naturalization Process: Determining Whiteness
based on the fact they could conceivably fall under
The “naturalization cases” refer to the
the catch all description of whiteness since their race
set of cases in which immigrants argued that they
was not explicitly mentioned in the censuses.47
should be allowed to naturalize under the provisions
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However, in Ozawa the Supreme Court
denied a Japanese man citizenship because he was
deemed as falling outside the Caucasian race and thus
could not be granted citizenship.48 The Court rejected
a color test to define whiteness and instead relied
on the meaning of Caucasian as “a zone of more or
less debatable ground outside of which, upon the one
hand, are those clearly eligible, and outside of which,
upon the other hand, are those clearly ineligible for
citizenship.”49 Like the Massachusetts Court, the
Supreme Court raised doubt about the concreteness
of the meaning of the term “white” or “Caucasian”
but nonetheless chose to advance the notion of
whiteness as a requisite of citizenship.50
In United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind,51 an
Indian national contested the denial of his citizenship
application. The Supreme Court held that “upper
class Hindus” could not be classified as white and
were therefore barred from naturalizing.52 The Court
conceded that trying to define whiteness through
biology or reference to Caucasian ancestry was
elusive and not scientifically sound.53 However, the
Court nonetheless connected whiteness with the
ability to assimilate by rationalizing that Europeans
were white because they could “merge into the mass
of our population and lose the distinctive hallmarks
of their European origin.”54 Within this definition of
white, assimilation did not mean merely adjusting to
“American culture” but instead losing one’s identity
to blend in with the white majority.55 Hindus were
denied white status precisely because they “would
retain indefinitely the clear evidence of their
ancestry.”56
Mexican Repatriation and Operation Wetback:
History Repeats Itself
During the Great Depression, President
Hoover authorized the removal of Mexican nationals,
although more than half of those removed turned out
to be U.S. Citizens.57 Due to the economic downturn,
the repatriation was intended to ensure that only
“true Americans” held jobs in the United States.58 To
assist in the round-up, all over the nation police raided
public spaces, including churches, and forced people
of Mexican ancestry onto trains and buses headed for
the U.S.-Mexico border.59 By the end of the decadelong deportation campaign, deemed “repatriation,”
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an estimated one million people of Mexican ancestry
were removed from the country.60
History repeated itself in 1954—just two
years after race requirements were removed from the
naturalization system. Congress passed Operation
Wetback, intended to deport Mexican “wetbacks,” a
term legitimately used in mainstream discourse to refer
to illegal Mexican immigrants.61 Operation Wetback
went hand-in-hand with the Bracero Program set up
by the United States to import temporary Mexican
agricultural workers in order to address labor shortages
due to World War II.62 While the United States
welcomed the labor of Mexican nationals through
the Bracero program, it simultaneously rejected the
presence of Mexican nationals beyond their capacity
as laborers. Hence, Operation Wetback was intended
to address the increase in illegal immigration that had
grown alongside the Bracero Program.63
Under the program, undocumented
Mexican nationals and Mexican nationals who were
legally present under the Bracero Program were
indistinguishable.64 Therefore, Operation Wetback’s
main mission of deporting “illegal” Mexican
immigrants served more as a cover to remove all
Mexican nationals deemed a threat to society. As
evidenced by the title of the deportation campaign,
once again racial difference fueled the exclusion
of immigrants who were deemed harmful to
society. Under Operation Wetback, more than one
million people were deported. 65 Like the Mexican
Repatriation, many deportees were U.S. citizens.66
Section Two: Extra-constitutionality of
Immigration Law
The evolution of immigration law since
Chae Chan Ping illustrates that, as a result of the
plenary power doctrine, fundamental constitutional
protections are applied in a highly restrictive manner
in the immigration context. Challenging government
action that regulates immigration is very difficult
since the plenary power doctrine also ensures that
courts provide deference to the political branches
regarding immigration laws.67 Without a check on
this unfettered discretion, the political branches are
able to abuse their power, as evidenced in federal
immigration laws that strip constitutional rights from
noncitizens and promote racial profiling.
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Noncitizens are described as not being
punished by deportation but merely regulated.68
Therefore, immigration proceedings are characterized
as civil rather than criminal.69 As a consequence,
many of the constitutional protections afforded to
criminal defendants are stripped from noncitizens
undergoing deportation proceedings. For instance,
noncitizens who undergo immigration proceedings
are not afforded many basic constitutional rights
under Article I of the Constitution, the Fourth
Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the Sixth
Amendment. Specifically, immigration regulations
can be applied retroactively, in violation of the Ex
Post Facto Clause of Article I, section 9 of the
United States Constitution.70 In addition, the Fourth
Amendment remedy for suppression of evidence
obtained in an illegal search or seizure is applied in
a very limited fashion to noncitizens.71 Noncitizens
do not enjoy a presumption of innocence72 and they
receive no Fifth Amendment protection regarding
the right to remain silent; silence can be used against
them.73 Noncitizens are also not afforded the Sixth
Amendment guarantees to an impartial jury, a speedy
trial, and right to counsel.74 Furthermore, the rules of
evidence do not apply to immigration proceedings75
and the government may use secret evidence against
noncitizens.76 The constitutional rights stripping of
noncitizens made possible by the plenary power
doctrine, makes immigration law immune from many
standard constitutional protections. As a result, police
action that would otherwise be unconstitutional is
considered legal when executed in the immigration
context. A prime example is the widespread use of
racial profiling to regulate immigration.
Section Three: Using Race to Identify
Noncitizens
Current Supreme Court precedent allows
for the use of racial profiling in immigration
enforcement.77 Amnesty International defines racial
profiling as:
[T]he targeting of individuals and
groups by law enforcement officials,
even partially, on the basis of race,
ethnicity, national origin, or religion,
except where there is trustworthy
information, relevant to the locality
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and timeframe, that links persons
belonging to one of the aforementioned groups to an identified criminal incident or scheme.78
Based on this definition, the legal use of
racial profiling within the immigration context
suggests that race becomes “trustworthy information”
regarding a person’s likelihood of being unlawfully
present in the country. Current immigration case law
demonstrates this correlation.
Under Brignoni-Ponce, the Court established
the legal use of racial profiling as a tool to enforce
immigration law.79 Specifically, “Mexican-appearance”
in conjunction with other articulable facts was
described as creating the reasonable suspicion
necessary to stop someone under the Fourth
Amendment. In Brignoni-Ponce, the Border Patrol had
set up a checkpoint in San Clemente, California.80
One evening, while the checkpoint was closed due
to bad weather, Border Patrol officers observed
traffic from their vehicle parked on the side of the
highway.81 They stopped respondent’s car, stating
that the respondent’s Mexican-looking appearance
was their only basis for doing so.82 Although the
Court found that Mexican appearance alone is not a
sufficient reason for stopping a person, it can be used
in conjunction with other factors.83
Brignoni-Ponce is a pivotal case because it
validated the use of racial stereotypes to define
“Mexican appearance” and connected race with the
likelihood of illegal conduct. The Court took the
government at its word that trained officers can detect
“the characteristic appearance” of people who live in
Mexico based on “such factors as the mode of dress
and haircut.”84 In no way did the Court challenge this
allegation. In fact, “mode of dress and haircut” are
merely examples of what immigration officers use to
detect someone from Mexico. Immigration officials
may be explicitly using race and accents as factors,
but the Court makes no inquiry into this. By not
challenging the government’s assertion, the Court
effectively allowed the government to decide what it
means to “look Mexican.”
The Court goes a step further by correlating
“Mexican appearance” with the likelihood of being
unlawfully present in the United States. In the
Court’s words, “[t]he likelihood that any given person
of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to
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make Mexican appearance a relevant factor.”85 The
Court concluded its opinion by stating the Fourth
Amendment requires that when a person is stopped
there must be at least “reasonable suspicion” that
the person is an “alien.”86 In reaching its holding, the
Court allowed the notion of “Mexican appearance”
based on racial stereotypes to create suspicion of
illegal activity. Brignoni-Ponce remains the law and
therefore, in the context of immigration regulation,
“looking Mexican” carries a presumption of illegality.
The correlation between race and illegal
conduct has been extended to target other ethnic
groups in the context of the War on Terror. In
Farag, the Government cited Brignoni-Ponce to
allow air transportation officials to consider “Arab
appearance” as a relevant factor when stopping air
passengers because all of the 9-11 hijackers were
“Middle Eastern males.”87 Even though the Court
rejected the Government’s argument, it did reaffirm
and distinguish the use of race in Brignoni-Ponce
since that case was formally within the context of
immigration enforcement.88
Even though in Farag the Court rejected
“Arab appearance” as a relevant factor when stopping
air passengers, the government need only turn to
its official national security policy to consider race.
Federal national security policy recognizes that racial
profiling, in certain contexts, is considered legal:
In investigating or preventing
threats to national security or other
catastrophic events (including the
performance of duties related to
air transportation security), or in
enforcing laws protecting the integrity of the Nation’s borders, Federal
law enforcement officers may not
consider race or ethnicity except to the
extent permitted by the Constitution and
laws of the United States.89
Based on the precedent set forth in BrignoniPonce, it is likely that the government may target
different ethnicities in its national security efforts until
a case comes before the court forbidding specific uses
of ethnic appearance, such as “Arab appearance.”
With the increase of local officials obtaining the ability
to conduct immigration enforcement, 90 after BrignoniPonce, racial profiling will continue to be widely used
under the guise of immigration enforcement.
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Using racial profiling as a valid immigration
enforcement tool allows racial stereotypes to gain
more social currency, both within and outside of
the immigration context. When immigration law
allows race to indicate a valid suspicion of illegal
presence, race becomes a factor that generally indicates
illegal activity. Furthermore, racial profiling of
noncitizens inevitably affects citizens of the same
race. This means that U.S. citizens who happen to
the same race as targeted noncitizens will be subject
to the same racialized standards of reasonable
suspicion. Countless examples of this reality include
the deportation of U.S. citizens based on “looking
illegal.”91 Additionally, racial profiling techniques
used by local law enforcement officials under 287(g)
are likely to bleed over into standard law enforcement
efforts.
Section Four: SB 1070
SB 1070 explicitly states that the policy
behind the law is “attrition through enforcement,”92
or exclusion of “unlawful aliens” by making their
lives so difficult that they voluntarily choose to leave
the country rather than being subject to deportation.93
As the law’s author, Arizona Senator Russell Pearce,
states “Arizona has made it clear through our policies
that illegal immigrants are not welcome, and they are
self-deporting from the state.”94 SB 1070 creates new
immigration crimes and mandates that law enforcement
officials determine the immigration status of a
person when “reasonable suspicion” exists that she
is “an alien who is unlawfully present in the United
States.”95 In fact, the law allows Arizona citizens to
sue officials or agencies they believe are not enforcing
immigration law to the full extent permissible under
federal law.96
In many ways SB 1070 is the modern
incarnation of Chae Chan Ping because it explicitly
attempts to exclude an immigrant community based
on the alleged threat that that community poses to
U.S. citizens. In the process of excluding, SB 1070,
like Chae Chan Ping, reifies notions of racial inferiority
by using race as an indicator of non-belonging. In
Chae Chan Ping, race was a barrier to assimilation
and thus justified excluding the Chinese. Under SB
1070, racial profiling is used to identify potential
“illegal immigrants” who “are not welcome” in
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Arizona. As a result, many critics have referred to
SB 1070 as the “breathing while brown” law.97 The
mandated determination of immigration status
based on “reasonable suspicion” is akin to mandated
racial profiling of mainly Hispanic immigrants. This
reality is confirmed by Arizona’s failure to articulate
on what grounds other than race law enforcement
officials will base their reasonable suspicion that a
person is unlawfully present. Arizona Congressmen
have fumbled as they describe factors other than
race that create reasonable suspicion of unlawful
presence: attire, accents, grooming, and shoes.98 It
appears that SB 1070 attempts to codify Brignoni-Ponce
and mandate that “Mexican appearance” be used in
enforcing immigration—despite politicians claiming
that race will not serve as a factor.
However disturbing the law’s explicit focus
on race, what is more problematic is that the current
legal battle over the law is focused on notions of
preemption: whether Arizona’s law conflicts with
federal immigration enforcement. While other legal
arguments regarding equal protection have been
advanced to overturn SB 1070,99 preemption remains
the strongest threat to the law. This suggests that the
true legal battle is over who gets to do the excluding
and racial profiling: the federal government or the
states? Recognizing that federal immigration law is
nearly if not equally as troubling as SB 1070, I focus
on the Arizona law given its explicit representation of
Johnson’s notion of transference and Ngai’s theory of
alien citizenship. In light of this, the popular support
SB 1070 has received across the nation suggests that
immigration law continues to be a powerful vehicle
of racial subordination.
Criminalizing Immigrants as Transference
SB 1070 creates new immigration crimes,
further criminalizing the immigrant community.
Kevin Johnson advances the theory of transference,
which occurs when society transfers its racism
towards minority citizens to noncitizens.100 As
Johnson explains, “immigration status, combined
with race, ma[kes] such treatment more socially
acceptable and legally defensible.”101 Johnson traces
transference, as it applies in the immigration context,
to the psychological theory that feelings toward one
group of people are refocused on another.102 As a
result of transference, Johnson believes that a society’s

SPRING 2011

treatment of noncitizens of color reveals its feelings
toward citizens of color.103 Thus, Johnson describes
differential treatment of citizens and noncitizens as a
“magic mirror” that reveals “how dominant society
might treat domestic minorities if legal constraints
were abrogated.”104 Not only does Johnson’s theory
help explain why immigration law has historically
treated noncitizens as racially inferior, it also explains
how immigration law implicates all citizens of color
regardless of citizenship—even though citizenship
continues to serve as a tool to exclude noncitizens
on the basis of race. SB 1070 is, therefore, a grave
warning sign for all citizens of color in Arizona.
Unlike federal law, SB 1070 makes it a state
crime for an “unauthorized alien” to apply for a job
or to solicit work publically.105 The latter crime would
affect mainly Mexican day laborers who congregate
in certain areas of town where people come to
solicit work.106 A related crime includes knowingly
transporting a person who is unlawfully present
in the country.107 Many of these new crimes come
with mandatory jail times.108 Additionally, SB 1070
makes not carrying immigration papers a crime.109 In
order to enforce these new criminal laws, SB 1070
allows law enforcement officials to ask for proof of
citizenship during a “legal stop, detention, or arrest,”
which can include questioning people who are victims
of crimes themselves or stopped for offenses like
traffic violations or loitering.110 If a lawfully present
noncitizen111 is stopped and does not have proper
immigration papers, he or she will be subject to arrest
and a fee of $500 for a first time violation.112 The
penalties associated with not carrying one’s papers
makes life difficult for all noncitizens, suggesting that
all immigrants in Arizona are unwelcome—not just
those who are undocumented.
In 2006, Hispanics accounted for 29.1%
of Arizona’s total population.113 This figure is
approximately twice as high as the Hispanic population
in the rest of the United States, which was 14.8% the
same year.114 The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that
in 2006, 6.9% to 7.7% of the State’s total population
was undocumented.115 These figures suggest that the
percentage of undocumented people in Arizona as of
2006 was not overwhelmingly large. However, these
figures also suggest that the increase in Hispanics in
Arizona was substantial. Applying Johnson’s theory
of transference, it appears that Arizona’s perception
of being “invaded” by “illegals”116 indicates an
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underlying fear of a general increase in the Hispanic
population as a whole. In fact, the Pew Hispanic
Center found that while the native- and foreign-born
Hispanic population grew substantially from 2000
to 2006, so did the non-Hispanic population.117 On
a percentage basis, “Hispanics have contributed no
more to population growth in Arizona than they have
to the growth of the U.S. population.”118
If the Hispanic population grew at a similar
rate as the non-Hispanic population, Johnson’s
transference theory indicates that Arizona’s fear of
“illegal immigration” is based on the fear of a general
increase of the Hispanic population, despite the fact
that in 2006, the figure of undocumented people was
at most 7.7%. In other words, Arizona’s “crackdown”
on the “invasion” of Hispanic “illegals” is not only
inaccurate, but indicates that fear of an increase in
the Hispanic population has translated into a fear of
an increase in noncitizens. As Johnson points out, it
is much more socially acceptable to target noncitizens
of color than it is to target citizens of color.119 As
a result, Arizona’s “crackdown” maintains popular
support in the state because society has equated
Hispanics with illegal immigration.
Due to an increase in the Hispanic population,
even though this increase did not outmatch the
growth of the non-Hispanic population, Arizona
has transferred its general fear of Hispanics to
noncitizens by over criminalizing immigrants. Samuel
Huntington’s disapproval of Hispanic immigration is
mirrored in SB 1070. This fear and racial animosity
results in the nation’s toughest immigration law.
Reasonable Suspicion as Mandated Racial Profiling:
Recreating the Mexican “Illegal Alien”
Particularly troubling is SB 1070’s mandate to
determine immigration status based on “reasonable
suspicion” that a person is unlawfully present in the
United States.120 This mandate leads to increased
racial profiling. As federal law demonstrates, using
Mexican appearance as a factor in determining
immigration status is lawful.121 However, federal law
indicates that using race may be permitted, whereas
SB 1070’s requirement that immigration law must be
enforced “to the full extent that federal law permits”
suggests that race must be used as a factor. SB 1070
states that race must not be the “sole” factor in
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determining immigration status, suggesting that it is
indeed a central factor.122
This increased racial profiling highlights
what Mae M. Ngai describes as alien citizenship. Ngai
describes the alien citizen as “an American citizen by
virtue of her birth in the United States but whose
citizenship is suspect, if not denied on account of
the racialized identity of her immigrant ancestry.”123
Ngai argues that non-white groups are deemed
immutable, “making [their] nationality a kind of
racial trait.”124 As a result, non-white groups obtain a
permanent foreignness that leads to a nullification of
U.S. citizenship.125 SB 1070’s mandated racial profiling
creates a similar type of permanent foreignness as
Hispanics, regardless of citizenship status, become
susceptible to being stopped and asked to prove their
legal status by producing their papers. No limit exists
on the amount of times a person may be stopped,
leading to the possibility that one must constantly
prove his belonging. As a result, Hispanics carry a
strong presumption of foreignness under SB 1070.
As Ngai states, “[r]acism thus creates a problem of
misrecognition for the citizen of . . . Latino descent
. . . .”126
To be clear, Ngai believes that alien
citizenship is a form of rights nullification that has
existed throughout history, specifically exemplified
by the territorial removal of one million Mexicans
during the Great Depression (more than half of
whom were U.S. Citizens) and the internment of
120,000 Japanese Americans during World War II
(two-thirds of whom were U.S. Citizens).127 Ngai
traces the creation of Mexican “illegal alien” to the
Jim Crow segregation of Mexicans in the southwest
who were stripped of belonging.128 I argue that SB
1070 serves as the rebirth of the Mexican “illegal
alien.”
Public Reaction to SB 1070
If immigration law is a “helpful gauge for
measuring this nation’s racial sensibilities”129 as Kevin
Johnson suggests, what does the nation’s reaction to
SB 1070 indicate? A survey conducted on October
31, 2010 revealed that fifty percent of Arizona voters
believe that SB 1070 has positively affected the state’s
image (this figure is up from forty-one percent in May
of 2010).130 The same survey also revealed that sixtyone percent of the state’s voters still favor the new
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immigration law.131 In fact, Governor Jan Brewer,
who signed SB 1070 into law, easily won reelection in
the 2010 mid-term elections.132
On a national level, civil rights groups have
certainly voiced strong disapproval of SB 1070.133
Litigation intended to overturn the law has also been
somewhat successful.134 However, since SB 1070
was signed into law on April 23, 2010, twenty-two
states have introduced legislation modeled on the
new law.135 These “copycat” laws suggest support
for SB 1070 by much of the country. In fact, during
the 2010 mid-term elections, SB 1070 served as a
major platform issue to gain political support. As
Politico reported, in order to win votes, Republican
candidates had to explicitly state their support for the
law.136 Furthermore, the day after the injunction on
the law, “59 percent of American voters wanted an
Arizona-style law in their state, while only 32 percent
did not.”137 States with high Hispanic populations
show support for an Arizona-style law above the
national average. For instance, sixty-two percent of
Texas voters favor a law similar to Arizona’s and sixty
percent of Colorado voters agree.138
The plenary power doctrine set forth in Chae
Chan Ping has led to federal immigration law that strips
noncitizens of crucial constitutional protections.
This reality has set the stage for state laws like SB
1070 that represent states’ frustration with federal
enforcement. Johnson’s notion of transference
is evidenced when states like Arizona with large
Hispanic populations develop animosity towards their
immigrant populations and show frustration over the
federal government not taking full advantage of the
plenary power it has over immigration enforcement.
While SB 1070 represents the modern incarnation of
Chae Chan Ping, the history of U.S. immigration law
suggests that Arizona’s attempts at exclusion based
on racial difference should come as no surprise.
The type of alien citizenship that exists for many in
Arizona is likely to spread as national support for SB
1070 remains strong and states continue to introduce
copycat laws.
Section Five: Recommendations
I recognize that the thesis driving
the arguments in my paper is unpleasant: U.S.
immigration law uses racial difference as an indicator
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of non-belonging and thus reifies notions of racial
inferiority. However, this truth is undeniable in light
of the evolution of immigration law from Chae
Chan Ping to SB 1070. Historically, immigration
regulation in the United States has explicitly relied
on race and notions of racial inferiority to deny
people citizenship status. Under current immigration
law, Supreme Court precedent allows for “Mexican
appearance” to serve as a factor in determining a
person’s immigration status. Most recently, national
support for SB 1070, a law that in practice mandates
racial profiling, represents the nation’s support for
excluding racially different noncitizens. In the United
States, it is far too easy to exercise racism under the
guise of immigration enforcement.
This grim reality can only be altered by
public education efforts that bring to light this
nation’s historic and contemporary racist treatment
of immigrants. Additionally, civil rights and
immigrants’ rights organizations must argue that
racial discrimination in the immigration context
deserves strict scrutiny—the plenary power doctrine
should not trump the Supreme Court’s practice of
applying strict scrutiny whenever fundamental rights
are implicated.
Public Education
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s inspiring words are
used by immigrants’ rights advocates across the nation,
“Remember, remember always that all of us, and you
and I especially, are descended from immigrants and
revolutionists.”139 However, racist immigration laws
and policies throughout our nation’s history reveal
that society has not been quick to remember that all
U.S. citizens are “descended from immigrants.” If
people have reflected on their immigrant past, then
they are quick to forget since it is difficult to detect
empathy and tolerance in our nation’s immigration
laws. In fact, the Senate recently blocked the DREAM
Act, a bill intended to put undocumented immigrant
students on a path to citizenship.140
I am someone who has dedicated the past
seven years to learning about immigration to the
United States, as well as global migration patterns.
Only until I entered law school did I learn of
the problematic use of race within this nations’
immigration jurisprudence. It appears that our
nation’s racist treatment of immigrants is a secret
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history to which most U.S. citizens have not been
exposed. In fact, one of the most famous symbols of
our country is the melting pot, which many people
believe represents the idea that all people, regardless
of race, religion, or culture, achieve harmony within
the United States. However, the “melting pot,” is a
metaphor that describes the process of assimilation
in order to achieve homogeneity in society.141 The play
by Israel Zangwill, The Melting Pot,142 popularized the
term. As our nation’s naturalization laws until 1952
show, that “melting pot” never included people of
color since being American also meant being white.
Education textbooks must include more
information about moments like the Mexican
Repatriation, Operation Wetback, and other shameful
moments in immigration history. A 2006 survey of
nine American history textbooks found that only
one dedicated more than half a page to the Mexican
Repatriation.143 In fact, as future generations learn
of the 9-11 terrorist attacks through textbooks, they
should also learn about the rise in hate crimes against
Muslim Americans and the deportation of 315,000
“alien absconders” selectively applied to Muslims,
Arabs and South Asians shortly after 9-11.144 However,
before parents can promote exposing their children
to immigration history in the United States, they
too must learn of this secret past. Only by exposing
the general public to this nation’s historic treatment
of immigrants will people begin to see through the
illusion of race-neutral immigration laws.
Breaking Myths and Humanizing the Immigrant
Experience
In order to dismantle fear campaigns created
around the alleged threats that immigrants pose,
additional public education campaigns are needed to
break the myths that permeate the public’s perception
of immigration.145 While doing so, these campaigns
should humanize the immigrant experience by
revealing statistics regarding mixed status families.
For instance, MALDEF’s Truth in Immigration
campaign should serve as a model campaign for other
organizations. Through this campaign, MALDEF
rebuts statistical and legal inaccuracies regarding
immigration.146 For instance, many people criticize
undocumented immigrants as making a choice to
enter the country illegally in violation of this nation’s
laws. However, MALDEF counters that notion by
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pointing out that more than 2 million immigrants
come to this country as minor children.147 On a
related note, mixed status families exist throughout
the United States, making it difficult to draw lines
based on citizenship that dictate who belongs and
who does not.148 These realities must become public
knowledge in order to combat fear campaigns that
dehumanize immigrants.
Litigation
Under current constitutional law, every time
a fundamental right is implicated, a law must pass
strict scrutiny.149 This standard requires that a law
be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling interest.150
However, all immigration statutes, due to the
plenary power afforded the federal government in
regulating immigration, receive judicial deference.151
Furthermore, the standard set forth in Fiallo states
that even when fundamental rights that normally
receive strict scrutiny, such as marriage, are at issue
in the immigration context, deferential treatment
still applies.152 However, Justice Marshall’s dissent,
joined by Justice Brennan, should give civil rights
attorneys a stepping stone to make legal arguments
that immigration statutes should not always receive
deferential treatment. Justice Marshall states:
[T]he Court appears to hold that
discrimination among citizens, however invidious and irrational, must
be tolerated if it occurs in the context of the immigration laws. Since
I cannot agree that Congress has
license to deny fundamental rights
to citizens according to the most
disfavored criteria simply because
the Immigration and Nationality
Act is involved, I dissent.153
While Justice Marshall limits his criticism
to discrimination in the immigration context that
affects citizens, his dissent does promote the idea
that immigration statutes should not always receive
deferential treatment when fundamental rights are
implicated. Cases brought by U.S. citizens who have
been wrongfully deported could advance Justice
Marshall’s stance. This argument can eventually be
expanded to noncitizens by civil rights attorneys
advocating the position that when fundamental
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rights, such as being free from racial discrimination,
are implicated, the Supreme Court should never
apply deferential review, regardless of the plaintiff ’s
citizenship status.
A particularly compelling argument to
incorporate is that the Fourteenth Amendment does
not restrict equal protection and due process to
citizens since “[n]o State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”154 The
notion that people present in the United States are
entitled to equal protection regardless of citizenship
status was supported in Plyer v. Doe.155 New legal
arguments that attempt to extend the Court’s rationale
in Plyer v. Doe must be advanced.
While the government may argue that national
security is a compelling interest that allows for its
unfettered discretion in regulating immigration, civil
rights groups should argue that the Supreme Court
must take a more nuanced approach to immigration
and not treat it solely within the context of the War
on Terror. Additionally, civil rights groups must also
argue that using racial profiling is not a narrowly
tailored means of achieving compelling interests
related to national security.
Achieving more than deferential review of
immigration statutes that discriminate, or lead to
discrimination, is surely an uphill battle, but these
legal arguments must be made. Perhaps justices will
continue to dissent and provide even more fodder to
civil rights attorneys making new legal arguments for
stricter review of immigration statutes.
Conclusion
SB 1070 exemplifies immigration laws’
reliance on race as an indicator of non-belonging.
In the process, notions of racial inferiority abound
as Hispanics become indistinguishable from
“unwelcome illegal immigrants.” SB 1070’s mandate
to identify noncitizens who do not belong is executed
through racial profiling. Johnson would likely agree
that Arizonans who support the law and recently
reelected the governor who signed SB 1070 into
law have transferred their racial animosity towards
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Hispanics to noncitizens. Ngai would likely agree
that the consequences of this transference results
in a state of alien citizenship for Hispanics whose
citizenship has been made suspect by the law.
SB 1070 results from a long history of racist
immigration law and policy in the United States. In
particular, the plenary power doctrine developed in
Chae Chan Ping has facilitated the creation of laws
like SB 1070 that claim to merely mirror federal
immigration law, which deprives noncitizens of
vital constitutional protections. The central debate
surrounding SB 1070 has become, who gets to do the
excluding of noncitizens: the states or the federal
government?
The only way racism can become divorced
from immigration law is to expose the general public
to this nation’s history of racism towards immigrants.
Humanizing the immigrant experience is also
important in order to question the idea that citizenship
is the ultimate marker of belonging. Furthermore,
society must look into Johnson’s “magic mirror”
and realize that its treatment of immigrants of color
reflects how it views citizens of color. On the legal
front, civil rights and immigrants’ rights organizations
must continue to fight the hard battle of gaining
more than deferential review of immigration statutes.
Only when these goals are accomplished will laws like
SB 1070 lose public support.
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A REVIEW OF BROCK THOMPSON’S
THE UN–NATURAL STATE:
ARKANSAS AND THE QUEER SOUTH
By Katy Bosse1

Brock Thompson begins his historical and
anthropological account of the Southern gay and
lesbian movement by outing his great–aunt Opal.
Thompson examines the secretive life she led, living
with her suspected partner Jerry, placing the story of
growing up gay in the South in a personal context that
frames the rest of his discussion.2 The Un–Natural
State: Arkansas and the Queer South tells the stories of
many gay and lesbian Arkansans from the 1930s to
the present, and how their experiences are woven into
the broader themes of queer identity politics in the
American South.
Thompson, who received his PhD at King’s
College in London and currently works at the Library
of Congress, divides his book into three segments,
each based on a different part of Arkansas history.
He uses the term “queer” to describe not only gay
men and women, but also acts of homosexuality
and many other actions outside the social norm
of the period. The first section of the book, The
Diamond State, focuses on the culture of drag shows
and its importance for gay community expression,
beginning in the 1930s through modern times.
The second section, The Natural State, focuses on
Arkansas’s sodomy statute and its transformation
from a generally antiquated and ignored law in the
early seventies to one that existed solely to persecute
homosexuals throughout the eighties and nineties.
The final chapter, The Land of Opportunity,
chronicles the attempts of many gays and lesbians,
especially in the 1960s through the 1980s to form their
own communities out of reach from an increasingly
hostile society.
The unique character of The Un–Natural
State stems not only from Thompson’s personal
experiences growing up as a gay man in Arkansas, but
his deep appreciation for Southern culture and the
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unique qualities that make it both a haven and a hell
for queer persons and activities. Thompson correctly
analyzes the many reasons many gays and lesbians
still fight to make a home for themselves deep in the
rural South when he says “There are certain things
about Southern culture – the closeness to the land,
church on Sunday – that so many do not want to give
up to be another face in the city.”3
While Thompson’s work focuses on the
relationship between identity, community, and cultural
visibility, the legal themes underlying his work show
that the law has been a constant partner in the fight
for establishing a gay Southern identity. This review
provides a brief analysis of the legal issues in each
section of Thompson’s book and explains how these
issues have both helped and hurt the Southern gay
movement.
The Diamond State
Thompson begins his discussion of the
evolution of cross-dressing with a 1944 “womanless
wedding.” These all-male productions, where the
prominent men of the town would dress up to
play all the characters of a wedding, were usually
conducted as church or upper class fundraisers.
Thompson compares these productions to blackface
and minstrel shows throughout the South: a forum
for powerful white men to bend gender and racial
boundaries, demonstrating their ability to do so
while others, mainly women and blacks, could not.
Thompson points to World War II as the beginning
of modern drag, where the same sex environment
gave rise to “female impersonators” in an acceptable
setting. He then traces the personal story of Norman
Jones, the owner of the Miss Gay America Pageant,
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to demonstrate the cross dressing transition from a
rural fundraiser to a queer entertainment outlet.
The history of laws regulating clothing
choice, generally called “sumptuary laws”, goes
beyond the South and stretches back centuries.4 Early
colonial laws, modeling themselves after Elizabethan
laws, prohibited members of society who did not
make a certain income from wearing certain clothing.5
Thompson discusses how Southern American culture
regulated race in many of the same ways it regulated
sex, as shown by South Carolina’s slave code, which
mandated specific clothing for all slaves.6
By the middle of the nineteenth century,
many American states had begun to pass laws
regulating clothing according to gender distinctions.7
In Toledo, Ohio it was a crime for any “perverted
person” to appear in the clothing of the opposite
sex.8 The act of cross-dressing was made a crime in
many cities around the country, including Houston,
San Francisco, and Kansas City.9 While Arkansas
never had a cross dressing law on the books, the city
of Little Rock passed several laws in 1868 banning
“immoral plays” and “indecent behavior.”10 While
not codified in Arkansas, it is clear that American
culture, especially in the South, wanted to enact laws
enforcing “appropriate” behavior.11
Some legal scholars argue that the regulation
of gender specific clothing still exists.12 In 1987,
the Southern District Court of Ohio found that
female students’ equal protection rights were not
violated when police escorted them from the prom
for wearing tuxedos.13 Males in the military have
been court–marshaled for wearing women’s clothing,
and male lawyers kicked out of courtrooms for
not wearing a tie.14 However, in 2010, the Marion
Arkansas school board ruled that a female student,
who usually wore men’s clothing, could wear a tuxedo
in her senior picture.15 Cross dressing challenges the
presumed relationship between men and women and
clearly shows the blatant societal construction of the
terms “male” and “female”16 as Thompson subtly
brings out in his history of drag queens in Arkansas.
The Natural State
The Natural State begins by comparing the
1976 Arkansas sodomy statute to the Georgia law
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upheld in Bowers v. Hardwick.17 The Arkansas sodomy
statute created a misdemeanor offense if:
A: A person commits sodomy if
such a person performs any act
of sexual gratification involving:
1: The penetration, however
slight, of the anus or mouth
of an animal or a person by
the penis of a person of
the same sex or an animal;
or
2: The penetration, however
slight, of the vagina or anus
of an animal or a person
by any body member of a
person of the same sex or
animal.18
The Arkansas statute criminalized only
behavior between members of the same sex, unlike
the Georgia statute, which criminalized the behavior
regardless of the couples’ sexual orientation.19 In fact,
Arkansas was one of only two states that reinstated
their sodomy laws in the 1970s after legislators
realized that the adoption of the Model Penal Code
protected homosexual privacy.20 Thompson then
discusses the repercussions that stem from branding
homosexuals as criminals through the use of state
sodomy laws. Most importantly, he highlights how the
laws helped to create discrimination and intolerance
within American society.
Throughout Thompson’s analysis of sodomy
laws and their role in promoting discrimination, he
draws attention to the similarities and differences
of the African American experience in the modern
American South. He states “This politics of skin – its
color, its exposure, its usage – worked to specifically
define the other, the queer, as the deviant outsider
working to unseat the status quo in Arkansas.”21
Thompson addresses the unfortunate increased
persecution of anything “queer,” with borrowed
Southern laws previous used to keep African
Americans out of society evolving into keeping gays
and lesbians out of the “normal” social customs.
In 2002, one year before the U.S. Supreme
Court overturned all sodomy laws in Lawrence v.
Texas,22 Arkansas struck down its sodomy statute.23
In Jegley v. Picado, the Arkansas Supreme Court found
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that section 5-14-22 of the Arkansas code, which
imposed a sentence of up to a year or a $1000
fine for homosexual sex, infringes upon the right
to privacy guaranteed to Arkansas citizens by the
state constitution.24 The suit was brought by several
Arkansas residents who all admitted they had violated
the law in the past and intended to violate the law
in the future.25 While none of the plaintiffs had
previously been prosecuted for violating the law, the
court found that because the plaintiffs had admitted
to violating the statute, they faced a daily dilemma
giving them standing.26 The Arkansas Supreme Court
conceded that there is no explicit right to privacy or a
right to engage in homosexual sodomy in the United
States Constitution, but the court explored whether
such a right exists in the Arkansas state constitution.27
By finding that the Arkansas constitution recognizes
a right to privacy within the home, a right to not
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process, and a clause prohibiting the interpreting of
rights in such a way that would disparage other rights,
the court found that there is a right to privacy in
the Arkansas constitution.28 Furthermore, the court
found that the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure
comments also recognize a right to privacy, which
affords an arrestee protection against invasions of
privacy.29
The court also found that the law violated
Arkansas’s equal rights amendment because the law
makes a classification based on gender.30 In examining
the constitutionality of the sodomy law, the court
turned to the Model Penal Code, which notes that
such laws “sacrifice personal liberty, not because the
actor’s conduct results in harm to another citizen but
only because it is inconsistent with the majoritarian
notion of acceptable behavior.”31 Combining these
ideas of equal protection and a right to privacy, the
Arkansas Supreme Court found section 5-14-122
unconstitutional.32
One year later, the United States Supreme
Court struck down a Texas statute criminalizing
homosexual sodomy as unconstitutional in Lawrence v.
Texas.33 The Texas statute stated “[a] person commits
an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse
with another individual of the same sex,” which the
code defined as “(a) any contact between any part of
the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of
another person; or (b) the penetration of the genitals
or the anus of another person with an object.”34
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The court analyzed the statute in equal protection
and due process terms and reached a similar verdict
to the Arkansas Supreme Court decision. Justice
Kennedy concluded that the state cannot make an
adult’s private sexual conduct a crime and that the
due process clause grants the right to engage in such
conduct.35 The Supreme Court laid to rest all state
sodomy laws criminalizing homosexual behavior and
stated that the Founders “knew times can blind us to
certain truths and later generations can see that laws
once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only
to oppress.”36
Land of Opportunity
The final section of the book juxtaposes the
development of Eureka Springs, Arkansas, which
served as both an escapist destination for many
Southern homosexuals and the town’s evangelical
tourist attraction, Gerald Smith’s, The Great Passion
Play. The town, equipped with natural hot springs,
first became an attraction in the 1890’s, postReconstruction. However, by the 1960’s, as the
mystical allure of “hot springs” as places of healing
fell out of fashion, the town of Eureka Springs fell
by the wayside. Thompson describes the entrance
of political figure Gerald Lyman Kenneth Smith,
a devout Christian who built a 1,500 foot statute
of Christ on the outskirts of town. Along with
the statue, Smith constructed a Holy Land theme
park with an amphitheater recreating the Passion
of the Christ story nightly. The play and the theme
park reinvigorated the town, providing a thriving
business community deep in the Ozark Mountains.
The reinvention of Eureka Springs and the natural
remoteness of the town, began to hold a new appeal
for many gays and lesbians seeking a community far
away from the rest of society.
Thompson also begins the section with an
analysis of the rural lesbian separatist movement and
the attempts by several women to find their own space
in the Ozark Mountains by forming lesbian-centered
communes. Both of these narratives combine to
depict the attempts by gay men and lesbian women
to defy increasing societal rejection and create their
own social constructs.
While Thompson provides a brief history of
prior attempts to self-select out of modern society,

61

the many gays and lesbians who have tried to continue
their lives within Southern society are still met with
legalized discrimination. The 1968 Fair Housing Act
provides no protection against discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation.37 Only twelve states and
the District of Columbia prohibit discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity
and six additional states prohibit discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation only.38 Arkansas is not
one of those states.
Arkansas has also codified a ban on samesex marriages that reads: “Marriage shall be only
between a man and a woman. A marriage between
persons of the same sex is void.”39 Connecticut, D.C.,
Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont
are the only states that currently issue marriage
licenses to same sex couples. 40 Maryland and New
York recognize same-sex marriages performed legally
in another state.41 A handful of other states provide
limited domestic partnership benefits to same sex
couples, none of which fall within even a broad
definition of the American South.42
Only twelve states and D.C. have laws
prohibiting employment discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity. 43 Nine others
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation
only.44 None of the states listed fall within the
American South.
Through his depiction of the dueling
personalities of Eureka Springs, Thompson
examines the growing Southern evangelical culture
and the growing social and economic power of the
gay movement. In this final section he addresses the
appeal and benefits of rural culture to many Southern
gays and lesbians, as well as the rising tide of bigotry
and ostracism against them. While the history of
the town of Eureka Springs seems to provide a
utopian glimpse of a more tolerant American South,
Thompson ends the book with a description of his
childhood minister’s snub during a town hall meeting.
Home from a year of graduate school in London,
Thompson attended the town hall meeting on a
resolution to ban the town from having a gay pride
parade. He took the only seat available in the room,
next to his childhood minister, who turned his back
to Thompson and refused to say hello. While the fight
for gay rights today seems to focus less on finding
an isolated space for gay communities, in the face of
the continued discrimination described above, it is
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not difficult to see why so many gay men and lesbian
women once sought their own space.
As a whole, The Un–Natural State is
Thompson’s attempt to combine his own history
with Arkansas’ complicated queer past. The book is
an homage to the unique space the American South
provides to gays and lesbians. It is also an analysis of
what it means to be a Southern gay man or woman
and a critique of the intolerance that continues to
pervade modern Southern culture. As analyzed
above, the law has both helped and hurt the gay rights
movement, providing protection one minute and
persecution the next. The Un–Natural State provides
rich oral recollections and historical narratives to the
controversial legal issues that still plague the on-going
fight for gay civil rights.
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REFLECTIONS OF A LAW STUDENT FROM
THE HIP HOP GENERATION
By Shailee Diwanji1

For an immigrant on the outside looking in,
America is bright, shiny, new, and full of optimism.
America is the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow,
brimming with hope and potential. It is, however, the
pot of gold he will never find. Many immigrants in this
country were forced to choose between the lesser of two
evils – corruption and oppression in their country or a
muted version of it here in America. Today, unfortunately,
America is still a land where an African American medical
student is pinned to the ground for the crime of driving
a Mercedes and where a prominent African American
United States Attorney is charged with a crime he did
not commit. To many, equality under American law is a
distant dream. They call it “the new slaveocracy.” “Slavery
was not abolished, it was polished,” they say. These are
radical proclamations. However, considering ‘colored’
persons account for nearly two-thirds of America’s prison
population, the slogans lose some of their radical luster.
At the very least, dialogue is necessary. The international
language of Hip Hop facilitates that dialogue through a
remarkable amalgam of sound and engineering.
Paul Butler, Dean and Professor of Law at George
Washington University, addressed the intimate connection
between Hip Hop and the criminal justice system in his
Keynote Presentation at this year’s Roots and Reality II
symposium. “Hip hop is political,” he said, “but it is not
united on any issue except for its critique of the criminal
justice system. America has used prison promiscuously.
Today, there are more black men in prison than in college.
Prison has lost its deterrent effect.” Hip Hop proffers three
main ideas that form the foundation on which our criminal
justice system should be built. First, people who harm
others should be punished. Second, criminals deserve
love and respect. And third, communities are destroyed
by crime and by punishment. Given this foundation, it
follows that judges, when sentencing, should consider the
effect of a sentence on other people in the community, just
like prosecutors do before indicting a corporation.
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Hip Hop, through its music, has broken
barriers of silence and started a dialogue on these vital
issues. Hip Hop is, however, not free of criticism. So
that its creators may earn “street cred,” misogyny and
hyper masculinity is pervasive in Hip Hop. Perhaps
as a result, a black man is fourteen times more likely
to be shot and a black woman is thirty-five percent
more likely to be physically assaulted. On the other
hand, Hip Hop is not so different from other popular
culture. Do we not see the same kind of misogyny
and hyper masculinity in movies, sports, and military
culture too? Roots and Reality II juxtaposed the gamechanging power of Hip Hop with its untenable
misogyny. It offered a unique and interactive way
for us students, die hard members of the Hip Hop
generation, to participate in this revolutionary, no,
“resolutionary” dialogue about equality under the law.
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SYMPOSIUM HIGHLIGHTS:
WHAT, EXACTLY, IS A “POST-WHITE” AMERICA?
By M. Coleen Wilson1

On March 23, 2011, The Modern American
hosted its annual Spring Symposium at American
University Washington College of Law. The
symposium, entitled “Minority Majority: The Social
and Legal Implications of a Post-White America,”
questioned the possibility of a post-racial America.
Minority groups are poised to become the majority in
America by the year 2050, marking an end to nearly
300 years of a white majority. Moderated by Professor
Pamela Bridgewater,2 the panel was comprised of
Horace Cooper,3 Jumana Musa,4 and Professor Lia
Epperson.5
The panelists started the discussion by
analyzing the concept of a “minority majority” and
what it means to be “post-racial.” A symposium
attendee proposed that the label “post-racial” is itself
a fallacy, and asserted that modern conversations
about race in America have become proxies for
much-needed conversations about class. All the
panelists agreed that discussions regarding race are
not necessarily substitutes or diversions for dialogues
about class.
Panelist Musa acknowledged the error in
classifying America as “post-racial” merely because
“the other” surpasses white Americans in population
alone. Musa opined, racial and ethnic minorities in
America have disparate experiences, viewing them
collectively as a “supergroup” demeans their individual
experiences. Professor Epperson suggested that these
groups’ histories of subordination necessitate a call
for coalition-building.
The panel also discussed how other societies
have dealt with such changes throughout history
in order to gauge how Americans will react to this
change. Parallels were drawn between South Africa
and the United States, with the panelists agreeing that
America’s unique history makes this current crossroads
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inherently different. This acknowledgment prompted
one symposium attendee to question whether there
is any merit to the argument that a White majority
is needed to hold America together by acting as an
“ethnic referee” and keeper of the peace. Panelist
Musa dismissed this assertion, stating that this belief
is based on the false perception of there being only
one type of white American, much like racial and
ethnic minorities do not have one cohesive identity.
The program quickly turned to a discussion
on the need for social programs in a post-racial
America. A symposium attendee voiced her concerns
about using the “myth of a post-racial America”
as a tool to discontinue programs and policies that
were established to counteract the effects of social
disparities.
The panel closed on a pensive note with
one symposium attendee noting that, while it is
debatable whether we are on a trajectory toward a
post-racial America, at least we are all privileged to
have a voice in an era where being “post-racial” is
even a possibility.
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is the Editor-in-Chief of The Modern American.
2
Professor of Law, American University Washington
College of Law.
3
Research Fellow, National Center for Public Policy
Research, and former Bush administration official
4
Deputy Director, The Working Rights Group
5
Professor of Law, American University Washington
College of Law
1

65

NOTES

66

THE MODERN AMERICAN

NOTES

SPRING 2011

67

NOTES

68

THE MODERN AMERICAN

About The Modern American
The Modern American is American University of Washington College of Law’s scholarly publication dedicated to
diversity and the law. The Modern American is a student-run publication founded in 2004. The Modern American is a name
that conveys the nation’s evolution as an increasingly diverse and complex place that is experiencing tremendous
change, both exciting and frightening, in the era of twenty-ﬁrst century politics.
The Modern American is not a traditional scholarly law publication that is limited to technical, sometimes esoteric
discussion of legal issues. Our publication believes legal writing must examine political, historical, and social contexts,
to engage in complex and full legal analysis. The Modern American publishes legislative updates, book essays, interviews,
conference reports, and other legal happenings, in addition to scholarly articles and essays that are relevant to people
pushing for legal and social change.
For more information, please visit our website at:
http://wcl.american.edu/modernamerican

Submission Guidelines
The Modern American accepts articles on a rolling basis. We will not publish articles over 35 pages in length. Please
e-mail all article submissions to tma@wcl.american.edu with a cover letter or C/V. Articles should be in a Microsoft Word
ﬁle, in Garamond font, and single-spaced. Citations should conform to A Uniform System of Citation (19th Ed.) (the
Bluebook).
For questions of literary style, authors should consult The Chicago Manual of Style (15th Ed.). Alternatively, authors may
also make submissions through The Modern American’s Digital Commons page at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.
edu/tma/.
Portions of articles that are already published may be eligible with permission. Please indicate all publications in which
your proposed article appears or is forthcoming. Please contact The Modern American with any questions regarding the
eligibility of your article.

Disclaimer
No portion of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of The Modern American. The
views expressed in this publication are those of the writers and are not necessarily those of the editors or American
University. American University Washington College of Law is an equal opportunity, afﬁrmative action university.
Copyright The Modern American, 2011

THE MODERN AMERICAN
American University
Washington College of Law
4801 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 615
Washington, D.C. 20016-8181

http://wcl.american.edu/modernamerican

Nonprofit Org.
U.S. Postage

PAID

Hagerstown MD
Permit No. 93

202-274-4247

tma@wcl.american.edu

Green Inks

